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Evaluating the Impact of Mexico's Quality Schools Program:  
The Pitfalls of Using Nonexperimental Data 
 
1. Introduction  
Recent economic research focuses on the quality of schooling, for good reasons. Evidence 
suggests that a one standard deviation improvement in math and science test scores can 
increase the real annual growth rate of per capita GDP by 1 percentage point (Hanushek and 
Kimko 2000, Barro 2001). Strengthening a person’s cognitive skills, as measured by 
standardized math, science, and reading tests, can increase that person’s earnings in 
adulthood (Murnane, Willett, and Levy 1995, Neal and Johnson 1996, Murnane et al. 2000, 
Altonji and Pierret 2001, Murnane et al. 2001, Lazear 2003). Moreover, improving the quality 
of schools can equalize income levels between racial and social groups (O’Neill 1990, Juhn, 
Murphy, and Pierce 1991 and 1993, Murphy and Welch 1992, Pierce and Welch 1996, and 
Hanushek 2004).  
Quality of schooling does not merely refer to the quality of instruction in schools. 
Family income, a child’s home environment, initial and preschool education, non-school 
learning, and other factors significantly influence a person’s cognitive skills. Nonetheless, 
schools merit interest both since schools play an important role in building skills and since 
public policy can easily change schools.  
Consensus remains elusive, however, as to what policy interventions can improve 
the quality of schooling. Experimental and non-experimental research has identified few 
educational inputs with statistically significant or economically large effects on learning 
(Glewwe and Kremer 2006). A large debate centered around Hanushek’s reviews (Hanushek 
2003 provides the most recent) examined whether increasing school resources could 
improve learning, but recent reassessments by Krueger (2003) along with several natural 
and field experiments (Angrist and Lavy 1999, Kreuger 1999, Case and Deaton 1999, Chay et  
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al. 2005) have provided more convincing evidence that class size and perhaps other school 
inputs improve learning. One policy of particular interest involves decentralizing 
management decisions to the level of schools rather than national, state, or local bureaucrats. 
The discussion focuses not only on education—other policies have decentralized provision 
of public services with mixed results (World Bank 2004).  
We examine the impact of a public program which sheds light on both school quality 
and decentralization debates—Mexico’s Quality School’s program (Programa Escuelas de 
Calidad, or PEC). We combine school census data, population census data, and program 
administrative data to evaluate the impact of PEC on dropout, repetition, and failure. PEC 
provides US$15,000 five-year grants to about ten percent of all Mexican public primary 
schools.  
PEC started in 2001 with the goals of expanding autonomy and improving learning 
in Mexican preschools, primary schools, and secondary schools. Participation in PEC entails 
four activities. First, the staff and parents of a school prepare a plan which outlines steps for 
improving the school’s quality. Second, schools receive a five-year grant to implement the 
activities discussed in the school plan. In the first four years, PEC requires schools to spend 
80 percent of the grant on supplies, infrastructure, and other physical goods. In the final 
year, schools must only spend 50 percent of the grant on such goods, and much of the grant 
funds teacher training and development. Third, PEC involves parent associations in 
designing school improvement plans, purchasing supplies, and carrying out the plans. 
Fourth, PEC trains school principals. Mexico requires no formal training of principals, and 
many principals switched from being teachers to principals without formal transition.  
Every Mexican primary school may participate, but PEC targets disadvantaged 
urban schools through direct mail, radio, and other media. To identify disadvantaged 
schools, PEC uses a poverty index that the Oportunidades program and Mexico’s National 
Population Commission (CONAPO) constructed. To identify urban schools, PEC uses 2000  
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census data to select localities with more than 15,000 residents. In the 2001-2002 school year, 
2,200 schools enrolled in PEC. But by the 2003-04 school year, 20,600 schools or 10 percent of 
all Mexican primary schools received PEC support.  
We construct a panel of 74,700 schools and use two common non-experimental 
methods to create a control group and estimate impact: regression analysis and propensity 
score matching. We compare and contrast the estimated impact of PEC on dropout, 
repetition, and failure rates. The preferred estimator, difference-in-differences with 
matching, reveals that participation in PEC robustly decreases drop-out rates by 0.24 
percentage points, failure rates by 0.24 percentage points and repetition rates by 0.31 
percentage points.  
The results provide useful information for a variety of other countries, such as El 
Salvador, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Nepal, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Yemen, that are 
developing or operating similar programs. They also guide countries seeking to improve 
learning and inform the broader debate on education decentralization.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews research on decentralization 
and school-based management. Section 3 discusses data sources and variables used in the 
empirical analysis. Section 4 discusses the empirical approach, while section 5 estimates 
program impact. Section 6 presents results, and section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Decentralization and school based management 
 
Authors generally argue that decentralization – the transfer of financial, pedagogical, 
personnel, or other decision-making power from central to local authorities – may make 
policy better reflect beneficiaries’ heterogeneous preferences, and that local management 
increases the accountability of political authorities. Critics emphasize that centralization may 
decrease costs through economies of scale, and that decentralization may decrease the 
quality of public services if local providers lack technical capacity or if local elites  
  4
monopolize the benefits of public services (see, for example, Oates 1972. Besley and Coate 
2003, and Galiani et al. 2004). Gunnarsson et al.’s (2004) model of education decentralization 
offers one reason why decentralization may improve outcomes: local decision-makers may 
know needs best. If principals, teachers, and parents know the areas that require spending 
and the technologies that improve learning better than national decision-makers do, then 
local authorities will spend on what is most needed. Eskeland and Filmer (2002) also 
theorize that school autonomy increases local power and that the participation of parents in 
schools pushes that power to be used for increasing student learning.  
Data offer mixed support for these theories. Eskeland and Filmer (2002) find that, 
consistent with their model, the autonomy of teachers, principals, and parents to make 
organizational and pedagogical decisions and the participation of parents in schools 
significantly increase primary school test scores in Argentina. Galiani et al. (2004) find that 
Argentina’s decentralization of secondary schools significantly increased test scores overall 
but decreased scores for schools in poor areas and in provinces with pre-decentralization 
fiscal deficits.  
A radical form of decentralization is school-based management, or the transfer of 
authority to principals, parents, teachers, and other actors in a school and its community. 
School-based management programs vary. Some programs give parents power to make 
decisions; others only give teachers and principals that power. Some transfer power to 
allocate budget; others also transfer power to hire and fire teachers, set curriculum, and 
change the school schedule. Some force schools to develop improvement plans; others do 
not. These programs also have different focuses. Some seek only to increase the freedom of 
school-level actors, some seek only to increase the participation of parents in a school, and 
some seek to increase the learning of students. The aspect of these programs which mainly 
distinguishes them from more common educational interventions – school building, teacher 
training, school feeding programs, or others –  is their focus on allowing school-level staff and  
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parents rather than district-, state- or national- level education staff to make management, 
curricular, or budgetary decisions. A limited group of other educational interventions might 
improve learning (see, inter alia, Jalan and Glinskaya 2005; and Glewwe and Kremer 2006). 
We focus on examining whether the new breed of school-level management programs can 
improve learning.  
Evidence on the impacts of these programs is mixed. A review of school-based 
management plans in the U.S. (Summers and Johnson 1996) finds four evaluations with 
comparison groups. Collins and Hanson (1991) compared mean outcomes in Dade County, 
Florida schools that the county had picked to create faculty councils with budgetary and 
personnel power against other schools without the councils. After three years, they found 
unchanged test scores but decreased dropout and suspension rates in schools with councils. 
Taylor and Bogotch (1992) mined the same data to find no significant correlation between 
teacher autonomy and student test scores. South (1991) compared trends in Scholastic 
Assessment Test (sat) test scores between 1985 and 1989 in Monroe County, FL, which gave 
schools power to make budget, personnel, and curriculum decisions, all of Florida, and all of 
the U.S. They found no evidence of better performance in Monroe County. Winfield and 
Hawkins (1993) studied a Philadelphia program which attempted to increase collaboration 
within elementary schools. They ran regressions including non-project schools as a 
comparison group, controlling for various background indicators. They associated the 
project with teachers purchasing basic materials and hardware but little change in reading 
test scores.  
Jimenez and Sawada (1999) examine 1996 data on Community Managed Schools 
(EDUCO), a program created to expand coverage in rural El Salvador. With no background 
controls, they found that parents of students in EDUCO schools were three times more likely 
to engage in daily classroom activities and significantly more likely to meet with teachers. 
Overall, EDUCO’s poor students had lower mean Spanish and math exam scores than the  
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wealthier students of traditional schools did. When they control for the portion of EDUCO 
schools in each municipality, they find that EDUCO has no effect on mastery of mathematics 
but expanded mastery of language by about two subjects, or one standard deviation.1 When 
they control for the factors that municipalities used to place EDUCO schools, they find that 
EDUCO has a positive but insignificant effect on language scores. They also found that 
EDUCO decreased student absenteeism. Sawada and Ragatz (forthcoming) use similar 
methodology to find that EDUCO has transferred few administrative processes to local 
levels but gives local actors greater perceived influence in hiring and firing teachers. 
Controlling for other factors, teachers in EDUCO spend more hours teaching, more often 
meet with parents, principals, and other teachers, are absent less, and attend more training 
sessions than teachers in similar non-EDUCO schools do.  
King et al. (1999) evaluate School Autonomy, a Nicaraguan program from the mid-
1990s that selected public primary and secondary schools to create faculty or parent councils 
with power to change the curriculum, choose textbooks, independently evaluate students, 
hire and fire principals, and set monthly fees for students. In other public schools, the 
Ministry of Education oversaw these activities. They find that program participation 
significantly increases the portion of decisions made at the school level but did not impact 
the level of influence felt by principals or teachers.  
 
3. Data Sources and Outcome and Control Variables  
 
Our empirical analysis is based on a variety of data sources. These are the annual 
Mexico School Censuses, locality level data from the 2000 Mexico Population and Housing 
Census, and administrative data files from the PEC, Oportunidades and CONAFE 
programs.  We combine all school data sources at the school level using unique school 
                                                 
1El Salvador’s math and language tests have 30 and 36 questions. Jimenez and Sawada define outcomes 
according to the number of subjects a student has mastered, where mastery is defined as correctly answering two  
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identifier codes, and then combine the school with the National Census data sources using 
unique locality identifier codes. 
To identify PEC schools, we use administrative data on PEC coverage in 2001, 2002, 
and 2003.2 One key variable for our analysis is the definition of the treatment variable. 
Specifically how should one define coverage by PEC? The construction of this variable plays 
a critical role if one seeks to evaluate the impact of PEC. We choose to work with two 
alternative definitions of what constitutes participation in PEC. The first treatment variable 
(T) is based on a strict criterion, requiring that a school must have received PEC funds in all 
three school years covered by the school census data we were able to access. Thus, T=1 
identifies schools that received a PEC grant in school years 2001, 2002, and 2003 is classified 
in the treatment group, whereas T=0 identifies schools that did not receive a PEC grant in 
the same school years (the control group).3 Based on the strict definition of treatment, there 
are 1,767 schools in the treatment group and 65, 457 in the control group, each school 
observed in 2000 and in 2003.  
Given that the number of schools covered by PEC increased significantly in 2002 and 
2003 we also constructed an alternative treatment variable (T2) based on a less strict 
criterion. The treatment variable T2=1 identifies schools that received a PEC grant in any of 
the three school years, while T2=0 identifies the schools that did not did not receive a PEC 
grant in any of three school years (the control group).4 Based on the less strict definition of 
treatment, there are 9,244 schools in the treatment group and 65, 457 in the control group, 
each school observed in 2000 and in 2003. 
The main outcome variables we examine are the average (across all six grades) 
dropout, failure and repetition rates in the school. To measure dropout, failure, and 
                                                                                                                                                        
of three questions (math) or three of four questions (language) in a subject. 
2We identify a school year by the calendar year in which it began, so 2001 refers to the 2001-2002 school year. 
3 Thus schools that received a PEC grant in one or two of the three school years since the start of PEC in 2001 are 
excluded from the analysis when the variable T is used as a measure of treatment.  
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repetition, we use Mexico’s School Census (also called Statistics 911), an annual listing of 
background and outcome data for Mexican primary schools. The dropout rate in any given 
school year t (spanning calendar years t and t+1) is defined as 1- (number of students 
enrolled at end of school year t divided by the number who enrolled at any time in school 
year t).  The failure rate in school year t is defined as 1-(number of students who passed 
grade in school year t divided by the number who were enrolled at end of school year t). 
Lastly, the repetition rate in school year t is defined as 1-(number of students who were 
repeating their grade at beginning of school year t+1 divided by total enrollment at 
beginning of school year t+1). Mexico’s school census also includes some information on the 
schools themselves: the number of classes, the ratio of teachers to students, the school type 
(indigenous or non-indigenous), and the number of rooms in the school. We include each of 
these variables, as a school’s size and teaching burden may influence its likelihood of 
requesting PEC funds.  
To measure locality background data, we use a version of Mexico’s 2000 Census of 
Population and Housing prepared by the Mexico’s National Population Council 
(CONAPO). CONAPO used the complete Census data to construct a poverty index for each 
Mexican locality.  PEC advertises to schools based on the CONAPO marginality index of a 
school’s locality. That index is a function of eight variables from Mexico’s 2000 census. 
Rather than use the index itself, we use the richer information contained in these eight 
locality-level variables. Mexico conducted the census only in 2000, giving data on these 
outcomes only for the baseline of PEC. 
Lastly, we include participation data from Mexico’s National Council for Educational 
Development (CONAFE) and Oportunidades (formerly PROGRESA), two social programs 
run by Mexico’s federal government. CONAFE targets mainly rural areas while 
Oportunidades has expanded from a rural focus to offer scholarships to poor urban students 
                                                                                                                                                        
4 Thus the control groups for both definitions of treatment are identical.   
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as well. We include a dichotomous variable as to whether the school received CONAFE 
compensatory program funding in 2001 and a continuous variable indicating the portion of 
students in the school in 2001 that received an Oportunidades scholarship. 
Most training evaluations include pre-program earnings and pre-program 
employment trends. Heckman et al. (1999) emphasize that the variables to include as 
controls are those that determine participation and are not determined by participation into 
the program. Some emphasize that the similarity of pre-program outcomes between 
comparison and treatment groups can be a litmus test for the acceptability of comparison 
groups in evaluating training programs (Heckman and Hotz 1989, Angrist and Krueger 
1999). By definition, PEC participation cannot affect pre-program outcomes or trends, but 
these variables may influence a school’s decision to participate in PEC. Following such 
work, we include one-year pre-intervention one-year trends in matching and regression 
controls. Longer-term pre-intervention trends might better capture factors which affect the 
trend of education outcomes in the school. Since our main estimating equations use 
differences-in-differences, which eliminate time-invariant school and community factors, we 
have more concern in capturing short-term changes in schools – changes in principals or 
teachers, an influx of migrants, new facilities, or others – which would affect outcomes 
during the PEC intervention.  
 
Changes in intermediate outcomes 
Before describing method and results of our estimate of PEC’s impact on outcomes, 
we discuss a reflexive comparison of changes in intermediate outcomes in PEC schools 
using data on changes between June 2002 and June 2004 from surveys of students in 505 
PEC schools. This information serves two purposes. First, by showing trends, these results 
show if PEC schools are moving towards the desirable goal of having schools function more 
effectively. Second, by providing detailed information on the state and trends of parent- 
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school relations, student satisfaction, and teacher performance, these data suggest areas on 
which any program to improve school quality in Mexico might focus. Since education in all 
Mexican schools was changing during this time and these data are not available for non-PEC 
schools, these results do not allow attribution of changes to PEC. Nonetheless, they suggest 
pathways by which PEC might affect any outcome.  
Overall, students in PEC schools report improved school infrastructure and security, 
unchanged involvement of school principals, increased parental participation in schools and 
in students’ homework, some improved and some unchanged teaching practices, and 
increased expectation by parents and students that students would complete advanced 
education. Despite these relatively rosy self-reported results, both reading and math test 
scores decreased by statistically insignificant amounts.  
Students reported statistically significant improvements in school infrastructure and 
security. Compared to 2002, in 2004 a greater portion of students reported that school spaces 
had recently improved and that everything in the school was very organized. The portion of 
students who claimed to feel safe and secure from danger increased by three percentage 
points during those two years. Still, a quarter of students reported that they did not feel safe 
from danger while at school.  
While 8 of 10 principals spoke with students and 9 of 10 principals visited classes, 
students reported small and statistically insignificant decreases in principals visiting classes 
or speaking with students. Students also reported improved parental and tutor support for 
and involvement in education at home. Students indicated that parents became 5 percentage 
points more likely to help with students’ homework, less likely to interrupt when students 
were doing homework, more likely to help students study for exams, more likely to read a 
student’s textbook, and more likely to explain what students did not understand from class. 
Nineteen of 20 parents spoke with teachers, but parents became more likely to help in  
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activities that teachers or principals request and more likely to worry about whether school 
was going well.  
Teachers exhibited smaller changes. About half of teachers arrive to class late - a 
proportion that remained unchanged - but 99.4 percent of teachers attend class every day. 
Teachers were reported to be “more happy”, to have more patience, to yell and get angry 
less often, and to less often speak with other teachers during class. Teachers also became 
significantly more likely to encourage students to continue studying. Several teaching 
practices - using teamwork, reviewing material that students did not understand, and 
commenting on homework - remained frequent. Students reported few changes in the 
efforts of teachers to involve parents in schools.  
Students reported no changes in their reading practices at home, and that their 
satisfaction with school, their class, and their teacher remained high and unchanged. 
Students did report that they were more likely to hope to continue studying past primary 
school.  
 
Descriptive statistics for PEC schools 
Table 2 describes the variables, and Table 3 presents mean values for these 
covariates. Compared to non-PEC schools, PEC schools are less likely to be in an indigenous 
locality and likely to have more students per teacher, more rooms, and more classes. PEC 
schools are significantly more likely to be in urban areas and are at higher altitudes. 
Compared to the localities in which non-PEC schools are located, the localities of PEC 
schools have lower illiteracy rates, lower levels of educational attainment among adults, but 
better access to sanitation, electricity, and water. PEC localities have a greater portion of 
adults who earn less than twice the minimum wage. Overall, this description fits the 
portrayal of PEC as generally serving urban areas (with better infrastructure than rural 
localities) but poor localities.   
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4. Empirical Approaches to Estimating PEC’s Impact 
We seek to identify the impact of PEC: what outcomes would PEC students have had 
if PEC had not existed? Given that we have non-experimental data, we cannot distinguish 
the effect of treatment from the bias generated by a nonexperimental estimator (Smith and 
Todd 2001). Rather than rely on one non-experimental  method with its strengths and 
limitations, we choose two and compare the impact estimates that we obtain by each 
method. The first method is based on linear regression analysis and the second on 
propensity score matching. Comparing the impact estimates that we obtain by each method 
highlights the weaknesses of the simpler methods and probes all methods for consistency in 
results.  
The central problem in the evaluation of any program is the fact that individuals 
participating in the program cannot be simultaneously observed in the alternative state of no 
treatment. To illustrate, let  1 Y  be the outcome for a given student in the treated state (i.e., 
during her school’s participation in the PEC program) and  0 Y  is the outcome in the 
untreated state (i.e., a non-PEC school). Then the gain for any given individual or household 
from being treated by the program is  ) ( 0 1 Y Y − = Δ . However, at any time a person is either 
in the treated state, in which case  1 Y  is observed and  0 Y  is not observed, or in the untreated 
state, in which case  1 Y  is unobserved and  0 Y  is observed. Given that missing  1 Y  or  0 Y  
preclude measurement of this gain for any given individual, one has to resort to statistical 
methods as a means of addressing this problem (e.g., see Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 
1999). The statistical approach to this problem replaces the missing data on persons using 
group means or other group statistics, such as medians.   
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For example, the majority of the studies on evaluation of social programs focus on 
the question of whether the program changes the mean value of an outcome variable among 
participants compared to what they would have experienced if they had not participated. 
The answer to this question is summarized by one parameter called the “Average effect of 
Treatment on the Treated” (ATT). Using formal notation, the ATT effect (denoted by the 
expectation operator E) of treatment on the treated (denoted by T=1) with characteristics X 
may be expressed as:  
() ( )= = − = = Δ = X T Y Y E X T E ATT , 1 | , 1 | 0 1  
( ) ( ) X T Y E X T Y E , 1 | , 1 | 0 1 = − = . (1) 
The term  () X T Y E , 1 | 1 =  can be reliably estimated from the experience of program 
participants. What is missing is the mean counterfactual term  ( ) X T Y E , 1 | 0 =  that 
summarizes what participants would have experienced had they not participated in the 
program.  
The variety of solutions to the evaluation problem differ in the method and data 
used to construct the mean counterfactual term  ( ) X T Y E , 1 | 0 = . Generally, the preferred 
approach is that of social experimentation or randomization of individuals (or schools) into 
treatment and control groups. Experimental designs use information from individuals in the 
control group to construct an estimate of what participants would have experienced had 
they not participated in the program, i.e., the term  ( ) X T Y E , 1 | 0 = . Random assignment into 
treatment and control groups equalizes the mean selection bias between the treatment and 
control groups, which then is eliminated when one considers the differences in 
() X T Y E , 1 | 1 =  and  () X T Y E , 1 | 0 = .  In the absence of an experimental design, one has to 
resort to alternative methods that involve behavioral assumptions which are typically 
difficult to test and more or less frequently violated.    
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The most common problem in the evaluation of a program with non-experimental 
data concerns the bias arising from self-selection. In practice, it may be impossible to observe 
and quantify all the variables that are critical in determining a school’s participation into the 
PEC program. An example of such a variable would be the motivation and drive of the 
school principal.  In practice, the extent to which selection into a program is based on 
unobservable variables is something that cannot be determined either ex-ante or ex-post.  
This fact, in turn, explains the preference towards randomized designs which ensure the 
equalization of biases between control and treatment groups no matter how selection into 
the program takes place in reality.  In the absence of experimental data, the common practice 
is to employ an assumption regarding the determinants of participation into a program. For 
example, selection into the PEC program is based on variables that are observables.  This in 
turn implies that selection bias can be eliminated by conditioning on these observable 
variables.  
Given the data at our disposal, this is the approach that we are forced to adopt.5 
However, we are able to do better than that. The panel nature of our data allows us to 
permit selection into the PEC program to be based on observables as well as unobservable 
variables which are time invariant. If (a) the motivation and drive of school principals is 
constant over time, or (b) this motivation changes only due to PEC participation, or (c) the 
changes of motivation not due to PEC participation do not correlate with PEC participation, 
then we can be reasonably confident that our estimate of program impact is free of any 
selection bias arising from either observed or unobserved variables. 
  In the remainder of this section we discuss the two alternative methods we employ 
to obtain estimates of the impact of PEC on key outcomes.   
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Estimating PEC’s impact using Regression Analysis  
We form a panel of schools observed in 2000 (baseline) and in 2003 (post-intervention 
year) and estimate a linear regression of the form  
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) t s U X y s T y s T t s Y
j j j Ty y T , 03 * 03 , + + + + + = ∑ γ β β β α , (2) 
where Y(s,t) denotes the value of the outcome indicator in school s in period t, α, β, and γ are 
fixed parameters to be estimated, T(s) is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the school 
participates PEC (i.e., is in the treatment group) and 0 otherwise (i.e., belong in the control 
group), y03 is a binary variable equal to 1 for school observations from the 2003-04s school 
year (after the initiation of the program) and equal to 0 for the 2000-01 (the year before the 
initiation of the PEC program), X is a vector of school and village characteristics, and  ( ) t s U ,  
is an error term summarizing the influence of unobserved disturbances. It is assumed that 
the disturbance term  () t s U ,  has two components, as in  
() ( ) () t s s t s U , , ε μ + =          ( 3 )  
 
where  () s μ represents an unobserved effect that does not vary over time but does vary 
between schools, and  () t s, ε represents an effect which varies both over time and across 
individuals. If  () s μ  or  () t s, ε  are correlated with the PEC participation (treatment) variable 
T, then the estimate of PEC impact captured by the parameters  T β and  Ty β  is likely to be 
biased. In our empirical analysis we allow  ( ) s μ  to be correlated with T, but we assume that 
() t s, ε  is a pure disturbance term that is uncorrelated with T.6 
In order to provide the reader with a better understanding of the specification in eq. 
(2) it is best to divide the parameters into two groups: one group summarizing differences in 
                                                                                                                                                        
5 There is also the alternative of trying to locate an instrumental variable (or more) that can be used to control for 
the role of selection bias arising form selection based on unobservables. As Heckman (1997) argues, proper 
instrumental variables are very difficult to find. 
6 All of our regression-based estimates are based on “robust” standard errors which means that we also allow for 
heteroskedasticity in  () t s, ε .  
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the conditional mean of the outcome indicator before the start of the program (i.e., α , 
and T β ,) and another group summarizing differences after the start of the program (i.e.,  y β , 
and  Ty β ).  Specifically, the coefficient  T β  allows the conditional mean of the outcome 
indicator to differ between schools in treatment and control before the initiation of the PEC 
program, whereas the rest of the parameters allow the passage of time to have a different 
effect on households in treatment and control schools. For example, the combination of 
parameters  y β  and Ty β  allow the passing of time (after the start of the program) to affect 
PEC schools differently from non-PEC schools.  
Based on the preceding specification, the conditional mean values of the outcome 
indicator for treatment and control groups before and after the start of the program are as 
follows:  
() [] ( ) ( ) ∑ = + + + + + = = =
j j j Ty y T T s E X y T Y E 1 | , 1 03 , 1 | μ γ β β β α X  (4) 
 
() [] ( ) ( ) ∑ = + + + = = =
j j j T T s E X y T Y E 1 | , 0 03 , 1 | μ γ β α X    (5) 
 
() [] ( ) ( ) ∑ = + + + = = =
j j j y T s E X y T Y E 0 | , 1 03 , 0 | μ γ β α X    (6) 
 
() [] ( ) ( ) ∑ = + + = = =
j j j T s E X y T Y E 0 | , 0 03 , 0 | μ γ α X      (7) 
Based on these conditional means one can then easily derive the three different 
estimates of program impact that are common throughout the program evaluation literature: 
the cross-sectional difference estimator, the before and after difference estimator and the 
difference-in-differences estimator. These three alternative estimators of impact are 
discussed next. 
The cross-sectional difference (CS) estimator of impact in 2003 is given by the 
expression7:  
                                                 
7 In year 2000 the CS estimator equals  T β  +  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 | 1 | = − = T s E T s E μ μ .  
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= − = ) 6 . ( ) 4 . ( eq eq CS  
() ( ) [] = = = − = = X X , 1 03 , 0 | , 1 03 , 1 | y T Y E y T Y E  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 | 1 | = − = + + T s E T s E Ty T μ μ β β .   (8) 
Expression (8) highlights the fact that the estimated impact of the program may be biased by 
any pre-program differences between treatment and control groups (summarized by the  T β  
term) and the mean difference in time invariant unobservables between the treatment and 
the control group (i.e.  () () ( ) ( ) [] 0 | 1 | = − = T s E T s E μ μ ).8 The presence of that latter term, in 
particular, suggests that unobservable variables may not only affect the cross-sectional 
estimate of the ATT effect directly, but also indirectly through the bias they might impart on 
the other parameters of the model such as  T β  and  Ty β . In principle, a credible estimator of 
program impact should be free of any biases inherited by pre-existing (pre-program) 
differences between the treatment and control groups as well as from differences in the 
mean values of the unobserved factors that may be correlated with the decision to 
participate in PEC. 9 
The before-and-after difference (BA) or reflexive estimator is given by  
= − = ) 5 . ( ) 4 . ( eq eq BA  
() ( ) [] Ty y y T Y E y T Y E β β + = = = − = = X X , 0 03 , 1 | , 1 03 , 1 | . (9) 
As expression (9) reveals, the program impact estimated by the BA estimator includes the 
trend or aggregate effects in the changes of the outcome indicator Y (summarized by the  y β  
term). Thus, the BA estimator may attribute a large impact to the PEC program, when in fact 
most of the change in the outcome variable Y would have taken place anyway even without 
the presence of the PEC program.  
                                                 
8 Note that in an ideal randomized design,  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 | 1 | = − = T s E T s E μ μ =0. 
9 An alternative to the specification of  eq.  (2)  is to replace the vector X by a set of school-specific binary 
variables or fixed effects. This alternative specification allows us to estimate impact only through DID. We have 
also estimated equation (2) using fixed-effects in place of the X-vector of school and locality characteristics and 
confirmed that the DID estimate is identical to the one that is presented herein.  
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The widely preferred estimator of program impact in this context is the difference-
in-differences estimator (DID). Assuming that the aggregate effect, summarized by the 
estimate of  y β , is identical for both treatment and control groups, one may obtain an 
estimate of the impact of a program that is free of any of the biases that are likely to 
contaminate the BA and CS estimators. For example, the DID may be viewed as removing 
the undesirable components from the CS estimate of program impact in 2003 ( T β  and 
() () ( ) () [] 0 | 1 | = − = T s E T s E μ μ  in eq. 9) by subtracting from it the cross-sectional 
differences between the same groups in 2000. Along similar lines, the DID may be thought 
of as removing the aggregate or trend effect  y β  from the BA estimate of program impact 
described in equation (9). Using the specification of equation (2), the DID estimate of the 
program impact can be summarized by the single parameter Ty β , i.e.  
= − − − = ) 7 . 6 . ( ) 5 . 4 . ( eq eq eq eq DID   
= Ty eq eq eq eq β = − − − ) 7 . 5 . ( ) 6 . 4 . (        (10) 
DID estimates using OLS with many years of data may suffer from severe serial 
correlation, as Bertrand et al. (2004) demonstrate using placebo laws on U.S. states. The use 
of few time periods with many groups partly addresses the concern. Furthermore, we focus 
on discussing nonparametric propensity score matching over the OLS results due to this and 
other aforementioned reasons. 
Mexico’s education data generally suggest that trends in education outcomes are 
non-negligible; hence, a before-after estimator is unlikely to reflect PEC’s true impact. Since 
PEC is a voluntary program, PEC schools likely differ from non-PEC schools in factors that 
will affect both levels and trends in outcomes. Hence, conventional cross section or before 
and after comparisons are unlikely to capture PEC’s true effect. 
Even though the DID estimate of program impact is the preferred estimator for the 
reasons outlined above, we also present and discuss briefly the other impact estimators as a  
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means of getting a better sense of the extent to which there are biases in cross-sectional and 
before-and-after estimates of impact.  
 
Estimating PEC’s impact using Propensity Score Matching  
Propensity Score Matching (PSM), first proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), provides 
an alternative, and, increasingly preferred non-experimental approach for evaluating 
program impact. Unlike regressions, matching has the advantage that it does not require an 
analyst to assume linear relations between treatment, covariates, and outcomes. Matching’s 
agnostic nonparametric method may result in more accurate estimate of impact. Also, in 
calculating the expected counterfactual for each treated observation, matching weights the 
observations differently than an ordinary least squares regression. In the regression-based 
estimates of program discussed above all the non-PEC (untreated) schools have a role in 
determining the expected counterfactual for any school receiving PEC (treated schools). In 
contrast, in the PSM method the comparison of outcomes is performed using PEC and non-
PEC schools that are as similar to each other as possible.  
As in the regression approach to impact evaluation, a key assumption for the validity 
of the matching method is that selection into the program is based on observable variables. 
The method proposes to summarize pre-treatment characteristics of each subject into a 
single index variable (the propensity score) which makes matching feasible. The propensity 
score is defined as the conditional probability of receiving a treatment (participating in PEC) 
given pre-treatment characteristics X, i.e. 
() ( ) ( ) X T E X T X p | | 1 Pr = = ≡ ,         (11) 
where T is the indicator for exposure to treatment (=1 if in PEC, =0 if non-PEC). As shown 
by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), if the propensity score  ( ) s X p  is known, then the ATT can 
be estimated as follows 
{} ( ) { } { }= = − = = − ≡ s s s s s s s X p T Y Y E T Y Y E ATT , 1 | 1 | 0 1 0 1   
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( ) {} ( ) { } {} 1 | , 0 | , 1 | 0 1 = = − = = s s s s s s s T X p T Y E X p T Y E E    (12) 
where the outer expectation is over the distribution of  ( ) ( ) 1 | = s s T X p , and the subscript s 
indexes the specific school.  
Following the common practice, we use a probit model to estimate the propensity 
score. The list of variables included in the probit model (the elements of the vector X) is 
practically identical to the list of variables used in the regression model (2). We then apply 
local linear matching which is analogous to running a weighted regression for each PEC 
school on only a constant term using all the non-PEC school data.10 We also verify balance in 
mean values of covariates between the treated and matched comparison groups. To measure 
confidence in this estimate, we repeat the matching process 50 times, each time drawing a 
random sample with replacement that results in the same number of observations as in our 
dataset. Since we sample with replacement, some observations are sampled twice and some 
never. The process mimics the data collection process and produces 50 estimates of average 
effect of treatment on the treated (ATT). We then estimate a standard error for these 50 
estimates. While bootstrapping standard errors for matching estimates is common, no 
formal justification of it has been provided and a debate has recently arisen as to the 
acceptability of bootstrapping in this context (Abadie and Imbens 2005). However, since it 
provides the most direct way to measure error in estimating propensity scores and in 
matching observations, we measure error by bootstrapping.  
Since PEC schools may differ significantly from non-PEC schools, the inclusion of 
comparison observations outside the common support in the regression may skew estimates 
of PEC impact. Propensity score matching controls for many observable differences between 
PEC and non-PEC schools, but ignores all the unobservable factors involved in the decision 
to participate in PEC. In particular, since we have data on few school-level factors, it is 
                                                 
10 Local linear matching converges faster at boundary points and can adapt better to different data densities.  
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unlikely that we can satisfy the assumption of conditional independence–the assumption 
that, given observable factors, PEC participation is unrelated to a school’s potential 
outcomes. Differences-in-differences matching may offer the estimate that is closest to PEC’s 
true impact. This estimator eliminates time-invariant unobservables. It also assumes that 
covariates do not change over time between PEC and non-PEC schools, and that the effect of 
covariates does not change over time.  
Given the availability of panel data on outcomes, we also use the differences-in-
differences matching (DIDPSM) estimator developed in Heckman et al. (1997, 1998a, 1998b). 
This estimator compares the before-after drop-out, failure and repetition rates of PEC 
schools with the corresponding before and after changes among non-PEC schools, 
conditional on covariates X. This builds on the simple differences-in-difference statistic by 
controlling for covariates X and estimating the differences using semiparametric methods:  
) 0 , ( ) 1 , ( 0 0 0 1 = − − = − = ′ ′ T X Y Y E T X Y Y E t t t t DIDPSM β ,       (13) 
where the subscript t denotes post-treatment observations, and t’  denotes pre-treatment 
observations. The advantages of this estimator are similar to the advantages of the DID 
regression – it eliminates any unobserved factors that vary between observations but not 
over time. As is I sthe case for the DID estimator using regression analysis, equation (13) 
assumes that given covariates X, the trends for PEC and non-PEC schools would have been 
identical in the absence of PEC:  
) 0 , ( ) 1 , ( 0 0 0 0 = − = = − ′ ′ T X Y Y E T X Y Y E t t t t . 
Thus, difference-in-differences matching allows selection on unobservables as long as 
unobservable factors do not vary between observations and over time. Taking into 
consideration the advantages over the DID based on regression analysis, the DID with 




Learning and Enrollment Outcomes 
We begin with a simple comparison of the mean drop-out rates, failure rates and 
repetition rates using the two alternative definitions of treatment or coverage by PEC, and 
without controlling for any background factors (see table 4). Put in another way, these 
preliminary estimates do not make any effort to control for the fact that selection into the 
program is voluntary. Such a comparison of the key outcome variables would be more 
appropriate if participation or no-participation into PEC was determined through a national 
lottery, where each school had an equal chance of participating into PEC. Given that in 
reality, participation into PEC is determined on a voluntary basis, it is important to keep in 
mind that such a comparison is more useful for seeing differences and trends between PEC 
and non-PEC schools rather than for determining the causality of outcomes.  
The CS estimates show that PEC schools have half a percentage point higher dropout 
but two percentage points lower failure and repetition rates than non-PEC schools. The BA 
estimates, on the other hand, show that between 2000 and 2003, the mean dropout rate in 
PEC’s schools decreased by 0.41 percentage points and mean failure and repetition rates 
decreased by 0.87 and 1.06 percentage points.  
A simple differences-in-differences comparison between PEC and non-PEC schools 
shows that dropout rates decreased by 0.20 percentage points faster in PEC schools while 
failure rates decreased by 0.18 percentage points faster in non-PEC schools. Since these 
estimates do not control for any background factors, they may not reflect PEC’s true impact.  
In table 5 we present estimates of program impact by taking into account the role of 
observable characteristics likely to influence participation into the program.11 Our discussion 
focuses on comparing and contrasting the various estimates of program impact. We first  
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compare CS, and BA, against the DID using regression analysis. Then, we compare DID 
using regression vs. DID using PSM. 
We begin with a discussion of the estimates of the average treatment of the treated 
effects (ATT) obtained from the regression model of equation (2), as these allow us to 
compare the impact obtained by the CS, BA and DID estimators. As suspected, the CS and 
BA estimates of program impact are quite misleading. The BA estimate of the impact of PEC 
on the drop-out rate (row 4) suggests that the program led to a decline of 0.411 percentage 
points. However, the BA estimate of the trend obtained for non-PEC schools (row 5) 
suggests that more than half of this decline would have taken place anyway in the absence 
of PEC. A similar pattern holds for the BA estimate of PEC’s impact on failure and repetition 
rates. The BA estimates suggest that among PEC schools failure declined by 0.867 
percentage points (row 11) and repetition by 1.064 percentage points (row 14).  
We mentioned earlier, the CS estimates of program impact are likely to be subject to 
even more biases. In 2003 the CS estimate of PEC’s impact (row 2) suggests that there are no 
significant differences in the drop-out rates between PEC and non PEC schools in 2003 (row 
2) while the failure and repetition rates in PEC schools are significantly higher in PEC 
schools. These cross sectional differences do not take into account the differences in drop out 
rates that prevailed in 2000, prior to the start of PEC. In 2000, for example, drop-out rates 
were higher in PEC schools than non-PEC schools (row 1). Combined together these cross-
sectional differences in 2000 and 2003, suggest that these differences between PEC and non-
PEC schools have decreased over time which implies that the program may be reducing 
drop–out rates, as well as failure and repetition rates.  
The preferred estimates, the DID, estimate impact by differencing the cross –sectional 
difference estimates of impacts in 2003 and in 2000, or by differencing the BA estimates of 
                                                                                                                                                        
11 The full set of estimates is contained in appendix A (using T as a treatment variable) and in appendix B (using 
T2 as a treatment variable)  
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impact in PEC and non-PEC schools. The DID estimator suggests that PEC has had a 
significant reduction in drop-out rates in PEC schools (row 3), no significant effect on failure 
rates (row 8) and a negative but insignificant effect on repetition rates (row 13).  
Generally similar patterns emerge when we use a less strict definition of treatment.  
Receiving a PEC grant in any of the three school years (i.e., using T2 as the measure of 
treatment) lowers drop-out rates by 0.093 percentage points (row 3) and repetition rates by 
0.034 percentage points (row 13).  
Next, we move on to the impact estimates obtained using propensity score matching 
(PSM).12 The most significant determinants of PEC participation include being a non-
indigenous school, having more rooms and classes, and not receiving compensatory 
programs from Mexico’s National Commission for Educational Development CONAFE. At 
the locality level, communities with more developed infrastructure are generally more likely 
to have PEC schools. 
The DID estimates of program based on PSM reveal considerably larger impacts 
relative to the regression-based DID impact estimates. Using PSM, we find that participation 
in PEC decreases drop-out rates by 0.24 percentage points (row 3), failure rates by 0.24 
percentage points (row 8) and repetition rates by 0.31 percentage points (row 13). In 
addition, all these effects are statistically significant. Using the less strict definition of 
treatment (i.e. T2) yields impact estimate that are lower, but these continue to be significant.  
One immediate conclusion that can be derived from these findings is that method 
matters. The fact that the counterfactual constructed by the PSM method weights 
observations differently than the regression approach and uses non-PEC school that are very 
as similar to PEC schools as possible, makes a big difference on the estimated impact of the 
program. Our comparisons highlight the well known fact in the evaluation literature that the 
                                                 
12 The probit estimates of the determinants of participation in PEC are contained in Appendix C (table C.1 for T 
and table C.2 for T2). We do not report BA estimates of program with PSM as these are redundant.   
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choice of the comparison group is one of the most important aspects of a credible impact 
evaluation.  
One might hypothesize that the impact of PEC would vary between types of schools 
and communities, so Table 6 presents estimates of impact allowing for heterogeneity across 
types of schools and localities. These estimates are obtained using T2 as the treatment 
variable, which allows for a larger number of schools in the treatment group.  Magnitude 
and precision of estimates vary across these sub-samples, partly due to the different sample 
sizes and also perhaps due to PEC having heterogeneous treatment effects. PEC has the 
expected effect in most sub-samples: for each outcome, only two of the ten sub-samples 
associate PEC with increased dropout, repetition, or failure, and none of these positive 
associations has statistical significance. In most others, PEC is associated with decreased 
dropout, repetition, and failure, though with greater precision in some populations than 
others.  PEC is found to have no statistically significant impact on the dropout, repetition, 
and failure rates in the 459 indigenous schools that implemented PEC plans. The largest 
impacts and most precisely estimated impacts are observed for non-indigenous schools and 
schools in urban localities. Impact does not have a monotone relationship with a 
community’s level of development—in very low marginality communities, where Mexico’s 
better-off citizens live, PEC has statistically insignificant impact on dropout but decreases 
failure and repetition by statistically significant 0.26 and 0.22 percentage points, respectively. 
But in higher marginality communities, PEC has in some cases larger and in some cases 
smaller estimated impact. 
 
 
7. Conclusions  
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Increasing students’ acquisition of cognitive skills can increase lifetime earnings, expand 
basic capacities, and potentially equalize a country’s distribution of income. Nonetheless, the 
many studies examining policy interventions aimed to improve schools find few that 
improve quality of schooling, measured by enrollment or test score outcomes. We measure 
the impact on dropout, repetition, and failure rates of Mexico’s five-year Quality Schools 
Program (PEC). PEC combines increased resources for schools with decentralization to 
allow school principals to make management decisions using the increased resources. 
  PEC has some similarity to public programs in many countries and U.S. states which 
give grants for local authorities to allocate (“school-based management”). Unlike some of 
these programs, PEC requires schools to design an improvement plan, involves parents in 
budget and planning decisions but does not let parents make personnel decisions, and PEC 
provides a short-term grant to schools and trains school principals while other programs do 
not. Since every PEC school receives these interventions as a package, we cannot distinguish 
their impact, but we can examine the impact of PEC as a whole.  
We construct a panel of 74,700 schools and use two common non-experimental 
methods to create a control group and estimate program impact: regression analysis and 
propensity score matching. We compare the estimated impact of PEC on dropout, repetition, 
and failure rates using these two methods. The preferred estimator, difference-in-differences 
with matching, reveals that participation in PEC significantly decreases dropout rates by 
0.24 percentage points, failure rates by 0.24 percentage points and repetition rates by 0.31 
percentage points. The estimated impacts are slightly lower but remain statistically 
significant when participation in PEC is measured as receiving PEC grants for any one of the 
three school years covered by our study.  PEC is found to have no significant impact on the 
dropout, repetition, and failure rates in indigenous schools.  
This impact has moderate magnitude—it represents a decrease of 6 to 8 percent 
relative to the baseline mean levels of dropout, repetition, and failure. Given Mexico’s  
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primary school enrollment of 14.8 million students in 2000 (SEP 2000), these estimates 
suggest that if PEC had operated in all schools in the year 2000 and had the estimated mean 
impacts, 35,500 Mexican primary school students would not have repeated a grade or 
dropped out of school, and 46,000 students would not have failed a grade. Students who 
drop out, fail, or repeat generally represent Mexico’s poorer and more disadvantaged 
students, so for these outcomes PEC enhances equity across students. These represent a 
fairly large group in absolute magnitude, though a small group relative to all Mexicans. 
Our comparisons highlight the well known fact in the evaluation literature that the 
choice of the comparison group is one of the most important components of a credible 
impact evaluation. The fact that the counterfactual constructed by the propensity score 
matching method weights observations differently than the regression approach and uses 
non-PEC school that are very as similar to PEC schools as possible, makes a large difference 
on the estimated impact of the program.  
The results suggest that PEC’s combination of increased school resources and local 
school management can produce small but statistically significant improvements in 
learning. The smaller sample for indigenous schools, which represent some of Mexico’s 
poorest communities with the worst education outcomes, may contribute to the larger 
standard errors in estimates of PEC impact these communities. But the smaller impact 
estimates for indigenous schools may reflect that PEC has less impact in them. This finding 
would cohere with others (Galiani et al., 2004) showing that decentralization of public 
management can improve outcomes in wealthy areas but has smaller or even negative 
impact in the most disadvantaged areas.  
Dropout, repetition, and failure rates represent good but not complete outcomes - 
measuring impact on test scores, completion rates, parental involvement in schools, and 
school autonomy would give a more complete picture of PEC’s impact. Collecting data on  
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these indicators that is comparable between PEC and non-PEC schools and over several 
years would facilitate such analysis.  
We conclude by emphasizing an important caveat.  Our estimates of program 
depend critically on the validity of our maintained assumption that selection into the 
program is based on observable and time invariant unobservable variables.  Including pre-
intervention trends in outcomes in addition to an array of covariates gives some confidence 
in the validity of our estimates. Our preferred estimator, the differences-in-differences 
matching estimator, while an improvement over simple before-after and cross-section 
comparisons, still suffers the weakness that it ignores unobserved factors which change over 
time between PEC and non-PEC schools.  The extent to which these factors result in biased 
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Table 1. Reflexive Comparison for PEC Schools, June 2002 - June 2004 
 2002 2004  Diff st. err. 
School management: In this year in my school… 
Some spaces improved   81.9  84.4  2.5  (.9) 
Everything is very organized   74.3  77.7  3.4  (1.1) 
Cleanliness improved   79.8  82.1  2.4  (.9) 
I feel safe and secure from danger   69.3  72.4  3.2  (1.1) 
The principal visited my class   90.3  89.5  -0.8  (.7) 
The principal spoke with students   82.8  81.7  -1.1  (.9) 
My parents or tutors…        
Help with homework   80.0  84.8  4.8  (.8) 
Explain the importance of doing homework   94.0  95.4  1.3  (.5) 
Interrupt when I’m doing homework   23.8  19.7  -4.0  (.8) 
Help me study when I have exams   77.0  81.4  4.5  (.8) 
Read my textbooks   72.6  77.2  4.6  (.9) 
Explain things I didn’t understand in class   90.6  92.9  2.3  (.5) 
Go to meetings   96.1  96.6  0.5  (.3) 
Speak with the principal   74.0  76.6  2.6  (.9) 
Speak with my teacher   94.4  95.4  1.0  (.4) 
Help in activities that my teacher or principal requests   87.8  90.5  2.7  (.7) 
Send messages to my teacher with notes in my notebooks   47.3  44.7  -2.6  (1.1) 
Worry about whether school is going well   95.1  96.6  1.5  (.4) 
My teacher…        
Attends class every day   99.4  99.4  0.0  (.1) 
Arrives  late    49.2  49.5 0.3 (1.3) 
Is happy and has patience with us   90.8  93.0  2.1  (.6) 
Yells at us and gets angry often   58.7  54.5  -4.1  (1.3) 
Talks with other teachers during class   68.2  65.3  -3.0  (1.1) 
Leaves the room during class   61.3  61.6  0.2  (1.2) 
Calls our attention when we are restless or disobey   95.6  95.7  0.1  (.4) 
Encourages us to keep studying   85.5  88.9  3.4  (.7) 
Gives me advice when I have problems   87.7  87.5  -0.2  (.7) 
Has congratulated me in front of the group   76.5  76.1  -0.5  (1.) 
Teaches us in a fun and interesting manner   95.2  94.2  -1.0  (.5) 
Puts us to work in teams   97.5  97.0  -0.6  (.4) 
Explains to me several times when I don’t understand   93.4  93.5  0.1  (.5) 
Reviews the exercises that I do in the classroom   96.5  96.4  -0.1  (.4) 
Tells us about the actions of the school   96.3  96.3  0.0  (.4) 
Reviews homework and comments on my mistakes   96.2  95.6  -0.6  (.4) 
Asks me to do special homework when I don’t understand a subject.   66.1  66.0  -0.1  (1.) 
Gives us examples to better understand subjects   95.9  96.9  1.0  (.4) 
Organizes sports or cultural activities outside class   69.3  69.8  0.5  (1.)  
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Talks to parents that look for them during class  93.1 93.9  0.8 (.5)
Sends notes to my parents in my notebooks   61.0  56.7  -4.3  (1.) 
Talks to my parents about how school is going 94.7 95.0  0.3 (.4)
I have heard that my parents want me to keep studying until…  
Finish primary   7.6  7.4  -0.1  (.6) 
Finish secondary   9.4  7.8  -1.6  (.5) 
Learn un oficio or finish a short carrera   14.4  15.3  0.9  (.6) 
Finish high school   18.9  17.9  -1.0  (.8) 
Become a technical professional   7.1  5.9  -1.2  (.5) 
Become a professional   26.6  30.1  3.5  (.9) 
I haven’t heard my parents talk about that   16.1  15.6  -0.5  (.7) 
Reading habits at home        
I have a fixed time for reading   48.9  49.3  0.4  (1.1) 
I read less than 20 minutes per day   45.6  48.1  2.5  (1.) 
I read more books than magazines   34.2  34.5  0.4  (1.) 
I read more historietas comicas than books   75.3  75.3  0.0  (.9) 
Student’s perspective on school        
I enjoy coming to school   95.9  96.1  0.2  (.4) 
I am happy with the class where I am   90.6  91.4  0.8  (.6) 
I like how my teacher teaches   93.6  93.4  -0.2  (.5) 
I like the activities we do in class   93.7  92.6  -1.1  (.5) 
When I finish primary school I want to continue studying   94.6  95.3  0.8  (.4) 
Test scores        
Math   419.9 416.5  -3.4  (2.5) 
Spanish reading   497.3  493.8  -3.5  (2.4) 
Sources: SEP 2002, SEP 2004. 
Mexican PEC schools, 505 
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Table 2: Description of Explanatory Variables Used 
Variable Name   Description   
School data   
tsch_1  School officially classified as non-indigenous   
Itsch_2  School officially classified as indigenous   
stratio2000   Number of students enrolled at school in beginning of 2000-2001 school year divided by number of 
teachers teaching at school in beginning of 2000-2001.   
rooms2000   Number of rooms in the school   
classes2000   Number of classes (grupos) in the school   
conafe   School received funding from compensatory programs of Mexico’s National Commission for 
Educational Development (CONAFE) in 2000   
oport   Percent of students in school that receive a scholarship from the Oportunidades (formerly 
PROGRESA) program   
Dtr  Dropout rate trend in 2000= drop-out rate in 2000- dropout rate in 1999.   
Ftr   Failure rate trend in 2000=failure rate in 2000- failure rate in 1999   
Rtr   Repetition rate trend in 2000= repetition rate in 2000-repetition rate in 1999   
Locality Data     
tloc_1  Locality has less than 2,500 residents  (rural) 
tloc_2   Locality has more than 15,000 residents  (urban) 
tloc_3   Locality has 2,500-15,000 residents (semi-urban) 
longitude   Longitude  
latitude   Latitude  
altitude   Altitude in meters (?)  
anal00   Percent of people aged over 15 in locality that can’t read or write a message   
spri00   Percent of people aged over 15 that never completed primary school   
sani00  Percent of households with no private bathroom or sewage disposal   
elec00   Percent of households without electricity   
agua00   Percent of households without piped water  
ocup00   Natural logarithm of people per room in a household   
tier00   Households in 2000 with dirt floors   
ingr00  Percent of active population that has income at least twice the minimum wage   
dist_salc00   Linear distance to health center 
dist_sec00   Linear distance to secondary school   
dist_medsu00   Linear distance to high school   
pobp500  Number of people in the locality above age five  
p5_hli00  Percent of people above age five that speak an indigenous language   
Drop-out rate, Failure rate and Repetition rates and the trends were derived from the 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 
School Censuses. School data are from the 2000 school censuses. Locality data are mean values for the school’s 
locality according to 2000 the Population and Housing Census.  
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  Mean  St.  Dev.    Mean St.  Dev.    Mean St.  Dev. 
Default rate in 03  4.23  3.46    4.24  3.56    3.82  5.10 
Failure rate in 03  4.31  3.28    4.54  3.77    6.12  6.18 
Repetition rate in 
03 
3.93  3.01  4.18  3.38  5.68  5.86 
Default rate in 00  4.64  3.60    4.54  3.67    4.04  5.14 
Failure rate in 00  5.18  3.53    5.52  3.86    7.17  6.73 
Repetition rate in 
00 
4.99  4.25  5.20  3.94  6.67  6.34 
             
stratio2000  28.64  7.35   28.67  10.41  25.81  11.51 
rooms2000  26.66  10.67  25.83  9.13   21.81  9.84 
classes2000  11.23  4.30   10.58  4.36  7.73  3.65 
conafe  0.18  0.38  0.30  0.46  0.61  0.49 
oport  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04 
             
state_1  0.01  0.10  0.01  0.10  0.01  0.09 
state_2  0.01  0.12  0.03  0.17  0.01  0.11 
state_3  0.00  0.06  0.00  0.06  0.00  0.06 
state_4  0.01  0.09  0.01  0.08  0.01  0.09 
state_5  0.02  0.15  0.02  0.16  0.02  0.14 
state_6  0.01  0.09  0.01  0.08  0.00  0.07 
state_7  0.03  0.18  0.03  0.17  0.07  0.25 
state_8  0.03  0.18  0.04  0.20  0.03  0.16 
state_9  0.08  0.27  0.06  0.23  0.04  0.20 
state_10  0.03  0.18  0.02  0.16  0.02  0.15 
state_11  0.05  0.22  0.04  0.20  0.06  0.23 
state_12  0.02  0.14  0.02  0.15  0.05  0.22 
state_13  0.02  0.13  0.03  0.17  0.03  0.18 
state_14  0.03  0.18  0.05  0.21  0.05  0.22 
state_15  0.12  0.33  0.14  0.35  0.07  0.26 
state_16  0.04  0.20  0.04  0.20  0.05  0.23 
state_17  0.02  0.13  0.01  0.11  0.01  0.10 
state_18  0.01  0.09  0.01  0.10  0.01  0.11 
state_19  0.05  0.22  0.05  0.22  0.02  0.15 
state_20  0.05  0.22  0.03  0.16  0.06  0.24 
state_21  0.08  0.27  0.06  0.24  0.05  0.21 
state_22  0.02  0.13  0.01  0.12  0.02  0.12 
state_23  0.01  0.09  0.04  0.19  0.00  0.06 
state_24  0.02  0.16  0.02  0.14  0.04  0.19 
state_25  0.03  0.16  0.03  0.16  0.03  0.17 
state_26  0.03  0.18  0.02  0.12  0.02  0.14 
state_27  0.02  0.13  0.02  0.13  0.02  0.15 
state_28  0.02  0.15  0.04  0.20  0.02  0.15 
state_29  0.01  0.10  0.01  0.08  0.01  0.09 
state_30  0.07  0.26  0.07  0.25  0.11  0.31 
state_31  0.02  0.13  0.02  0.14  0.01  0.12 
state_32  0.02  0.14  0.01  0.11  0.02  0.15 
                  
tsch_1  0.99  0.11  0.95  0.22  0.89  0.31 
tsch_2  0.01  0.11  0.05  0.22  0.11  0.31 
tloc_1  0.20  0.40  0.28  0.45  0.64  0.48 
tloc_2  0.63  0.48  0.54  0.50  0.28  0.45 
tloc_3  0.17  0.37  0.18  0.38  0.08  0.27 
             
Dtr  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.06 
Ftr  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.06  
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Rtr  0.00  0.04  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.06 
pobp500  242079 358673  209064  347041  124378  296955 
p5_hli00  6.24  17.73   8.85  22.16  13.27  29.46 
dist_sal00  437  2567   549  2268  2250  3367 
dist_sec00  130  671  223  966   1617  2800 
dist_medsu00  1667  4411  2688  6273  6513  8910 
longitud00  998249 45919   997393  53128   994842  46768 
latitud00  209612 35196   212113  36668   204672  33768 
altitud00  1301  904   1233  938   1193  895 
ocup00  0.45  0.27  0.49  0.30  0.69  0.39 
anal00 8.65  7.62    10.17  9.71    17.13  14.30 
spri00  27.44  14.47  30.54  16.82  44.43  21.36 
sani00  11.82  12.44  14.89  17.28  27.06  27.26 
elec00  3.11  6.83  4.38  10.22    13.29  25.06 
agua00  12.43  17.91  15.22  22.46  32.36  36.55 
tier00  12.26  15.61  14.05  18.17  30.38  30.34 
ingr00  52.56  18.73  54.79  20.13  69.03  23.14 
Note: Drop-out rates, Failure rates and Repetition rates are in percent. 
Source: 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 School Censuses. School data are from the 2000 school censuses. 
Locality data are mean values for the school’s locality according to the 2000 the Population and Housing Census. 
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Table 4: Unconditional means of the three education outcomes examined 
 
Treatment variable=T 




Received PEC benefits in ANY school year 
Outcome  and  Group  2000 2003  2003-2000   2000 2003  2003-2000 
Dropout           
PEC  4.64 4.23 -0.41    4.54 4.24 -0.31 
Non-PEC  4.04 3.82 -0.21    4.04 3.82 -0.21 
Difference: PEC-Non-PEC   0.60 0.40 -0.20    0.51 0.41 -0.09 
           
Failure           
PEC  5.18 4.31 -0.87    5.52 4.54 -0.98 
Non-PEC  7.17 6.12 -1.05    7.17 6.12 -1.05 
Difference: PEC-Non-PEC  -1.99 -1.81 0.18    -1.65 -1.59  0.07 
           
Repetition           
PEC  4.99 3.93 -1.06    5.20 4.18 -1.02 
Non-PEC  6.67 5.68 -0.99    6.67 5.68 -0.99 
Difference: PEC-Non-PEC  -1.68 -1.75 -0.08    -1.46 -1.50  -0.03 
Sources: School Census 2000 and 2003.  
Standard errors in parentheses. Mexican primary schools, 
Treatment variable T: 1,767 PEC schools and 65,457 non-PEC schools 
Treatment variable T2:  9,244 PEC schools and 65,457 non-PEC schools 
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Table 5: Estimates of the ATT Effect of PEC Based on Regression (OLS) and Local Linear Regression PSM  
  T    T2 
  OLS LLR-PSM    OLS LLR-PSM 
Dropout  ATT st.  err. ATT st.  err.    ATT st.  err. ATT st.  err. 
(1)  PEC-Non-PEC  diff  CS  (2000)  0.284 0.071 0.201 0.066    0.208 0.051 0.150 0.038 
             
(2) PEC-Non-PEC diff CS (2003 )  0.085  0.079  -0.037  0.074    0.115  0.051  0.052  0.048 
             
(3) DID PEC-Non-PEC: (2)-(1)  -0.199  0.106  -0.239  0.091    -0.093  0.070  -0.098  0.042 
             
(4) PEC 2003-2000: BA   -0.411  0.103        -0.306  0.066     
             
(5) non-PEC 2003-2000: BA  -0.213  0.026        -0.213  0.025     
              
Failure              
(6)  PEC-Non-PEC  diff  CS  (2000)  0.198 0.070 0.491 0.078    0.187 0.058 0.435 0.042 
             
(7) PEC-Non-PEC diff CS (2003 )  0.378  0.071  0.255  0.057    0.256  0.058  0.222  0.039 
             
(8) DID PEC-Non-PEC: (2)-(1)  0.180  0.100  -0.236  0.052    0.069  0.080  -0.213  0.032 
             
(9) PEC 2003-2000: BA   -0.867  0.095        -0.978  0.075     
             
(10) non-PEC 2003-2000: BA  -1.047  0.029        -1.047  0.028     
              
Repetition              
(11) PEC-Non-PEC diff CS (2000)  0.325  0.083  0.524  0.074    0.254  0.056  0.445  0.038 
             
(12) PEC-Non-PEC diff CS (2003 )  0.249  0.068  0.211  0.064    0.221  0.056  0.219  0.037 
             
(13) DID PEC-Non-PEC: (2)-(1)  -0.077  0.107  -0.313  0.068    -0.034  0.077  -0.226  0.036 
              
(14) PEC 2003-2000: BA  -1.063  0.103        -1.021  0.072     
              
(15) non-PEC 2003-2000: BA  -0.987  0.028        -0.987  0.027     
Source: Authors’ estimates. The standard errors reported are bootstrap standard errors from 50 replications with 100% replacement sampling.  
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Table 6: Local Linear Regression Matching estimates of heterogeneous PEC impact on dropout, repetition, and 
failure 
 
Outcome and group   ATT  St. error  N(pec)  N(Non-pec) 
Dropout       
Non-indigenous schools   -0.105 0.046 8,783 58,249 
Indigenous schools   0.049 0.202  459  6,145 
Rural locality   -0.038 0.075 2,633 41,746 
Urban locality   -0.134 0.070 4,948 18,548 
Semi-urban locality   -0.043 0.092 1,663  5,098 
Very low marginality locality   -0.057 0.088 3,116 12,286 
Low marginality locality   -0.036 0.058 2,791  9,708 
Moderate marginality locality   -0.099 0.090 1,414  9,476 
High marginality locality   -0.140 0.087 1,708 24,474 
Very high marginality locality   0.428 0.263  215  9,086 
Failure       
Non-indigenous schools   -0.226 0.041 8,783 58,249 
Indigenous schools   0.354 0.293  459  6,145 
Rural locality   -0.126 0.076 2,633 41,746 
Urban locality   -0.193 0.040 4,948 18,548 
Semi-urban locality   -0.182 0.086 1,663  5,098 
Very low marginality locality   -0.256 0.054 3,116 12,286 
Low marginality locality   -0.242 0.063 2,791  9,708 
Moderate marginality locality   0.034 0.093 1,414 9,476 
High marginality locality   -0.163 0.102 1,708 24,474 
Very high marginality locality   -0.148 0.383  215  9,086 
Repetition       
Non-indigenous schools   -0.239 0.037 8,783 58,249 
Indigenous schools   0.177 0.267  459  6,145 
Rural locality   -0.241 0.066 2,633 41,746 
Urban locality   -0.213 0.045 4,948 18,548 
Semi-urban locality   -0.126 0.074 1,663  5,098 
Very low marginality locality   -0.219 0.068 3,116 12,286 
Low marginality locality   -0.261 0.042 2,791  9,708 
Moderate marginality locality   -0.037 0.100 1,414  9,476 
High marginality locality   -0.271 0.111 1,708 24,474 
Very high marginality locality   0.025 0.396  215  9,086 
Sources: National and School Census 2000, 2003. The standard errors reported are bootstrap standard errors from 50 
replications with 100% replacement sampling.  
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APPENDIX A--Regression-based estimates of PEC’s Impact on Schools that received PEC 
benefits in ALL three school years 
A.1 Outcome Variable= Drop-out Rate 
TREATMENT = T =School received PEC benefits in ALL 3 school years 
 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =  134448 
                                                       F( 61,134386) =  311.70 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1797 
                                                       Root MSE      =  4.6113 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      D_rate |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           T |   .2839694   .0714137     3.98   0.000     .1439998     .423939 
       Y2003 |  -.2127554   .0256822    -8.28   0.000    -.2630921   -.1624188 
         YxT |  -.1985707   .1057657    -1.88   0.060    -.4058695    .0087281 
 stratio2000 |   .0017374   .0017545     0.99   0.322    -.0017013    .0051762 
   rooms2000 |   -.039944   .0023499   -17.00   0.000    -.0445498   -.0353382 
 classes2000 |  -.1217312   .0046209   -26.34   0.000    -.1307881   -.1126743 
      conafe |   .1255576   .0413003     3.04   0.002     .0446097    .2065054 
       oport |  -.5741528   .2832379    -2.03   0.043    -1.129294   -.0190118 
     state_1 |   .5471609   .3264344     1.68   0.094    -.0926446    1.186966 
     state_2 |   3.175238   .5325506     5.96   0.000     2.131449    4.219028 
     state_3 |   2.793311     .48483     5.76   0.000     1.843053    3.743569 
     state_4 |   1.060455   .2279305     4.65   0.000     .6137154    1.507195 
     state_5 |   -.599492   .2971674    -2.02   0.044    -1.181935   -.0170492 
     state_6 |    3.83233   .4276458     8.96   0.000     2.994152    4.670508 
     state_7 |    .155493   .2229683     0.70   0.486    -.2815208    .5925068 
     state_8 |   2.532892   .3663591     6.91   0.000     1.814835     3.25095 
     state_9 |  -1.327793   .2850337    -4.66   0.000    -1.886454   -.7691322 
    state_10 |   2.707405   .3389395     7.99   0.000      2.04309    3.371721 
    state_11 |   .7862809   .2988288     2.63   0.009      .200582     1.37198 
    state_12 |   .2022684   .2955007     0.68   0.494    -.3769075    .7814443 
    state_13 |  -.5695941   .2656968    -2.14   0.032    -1.090355   -.0488333 
    state_14 |   .8505989   .3309742     2.57   0.010     .2018955    1.499302 
    state_15 |   .3158163   .2762511     1.14   0.253    -.2256307    .8572633 
    state_16 |   -.158284   .3074749    -0.51   0.607    -.7609292    .4443612 
    state_17 |   .7962133   .2914825     2.73   0.006      .224913    1.367514 
    state_18 |   1.760598   .3668832     4.80   0.000     1.041514    2.479682 
    state_19 |   .8400899   .2875693     2.92   0.003     .2764593     1.40372 
    state_20 |   .6390194   .2598915     2.46   0.014     .1296368    1.148402 
    state_21 |  -.4873142   .2610304    -1.87   0.062    -.9989291    .0243006 
    state_22 |  -.8800625   .2831604    -3.11   0.002    -1.435052   -.3250733 
    state_23 |  (dropped) 
    state_24 |  -.3698927   .2761134    -1.34   0.180    -.9110698    .1712844 
    state_25 |    1.97074   .3889941     5.07   0.000     1.208319    2.733161 
    state_26 |   2.510447   .4213136     5.96   0.000      1.68468    3.336214 
    state_27 |  -.6876937   .2150694    -3.20   0.001    -1.109226   -.2661616 
    state_28 |   1.662448   .2663559     6.24   0.000     1.140395    2.184501 
    state_29 |  -.8141709    .269401    -3.02   0.003    -1.342192   -.2861499 
    state_30 |   .0965331   .2465719     0.39   0.695    -.3867433    .5798095 
    state_31 |  -.2907091   .1939152    -1.50   0.134    -.6707793    .0893611 
    state_32 |   .9734917   .3148637     3.09   0.002     .3563647    1.590619 
      tsch_1 |   .4292741   .0578131     7.43   0.000     .3159615    .5425867 
      tsch_2 |  (dropped) 
      tloc_1 |  -1.925477    .061858   -31.13   0.000    -2.046717   -1.804236 
      tloc_2 |  (dropped) 
      tloc_3 |  -.7226257   .0512604   -14.10   0.000    -.8230952   -.6221562 
         Dtr |   25.52697   .6361546    40.13   0.000     24.28012    26.77383 
         Ftr |  -.1273106   .6451291    -0.20   0.844    -1.391752    1.137131 
         Rtr |  -.3348523    .570907    -0.59   0.558     -1.45382    .7841149 
     pobp500 |   3.42e-07   6.09e-08     5.63   0.000     2.23e-07    4.62e-07 
    p5_hli00 |   -.006215   .0006937    -8.96   0.000    -.0075748   -.0048553 
  dist_sal00 |   .0000157   6.36e-06     2.48   0.013     3.28e-06    .0000282 
  dist_sec00 |   .0000577   8.12e-06     7.11   0.000     .0000418    .0000737 
dist_medsu00 |   5.27e-06   2.46e-06     2.14   0.032     4.44e-07    .0000101 
  longitud00 |  -5.63e-07   1.84e-06    -0.31   0.760    -4.17e-06    3.05e-06 
   latitud00 |  -1.65e-06   1.74e-06    -0.95   0.343    -5.07e-06    1.76e-06 
   altitud00 |  -.0001506    .000023    -6.55   0.000    -.0001957   -.0001055 
      ocup00 |   .3560121    .077375     4.60   0.000     .2043585    .5076658 
      anal00 |   .0182514    .002619     6.97   0.000     .0131182    .0233846 
      spri00 |   .0146275   .0020881     7.01   0.000     .0105349    .0187202 
      sani00 |  -.0033446   .0007385    -4.53   0.000     -.004792   -.0018971 
      elec00 |   .0059956   .0007938     7.55   0.000     .0044397    .0075514 
      agua00 |  -.0016647   .0004879    -3.41   0.001    -.0026209   -.0007085 
      tier00 |   -.013339   .0009844   -13.55   0.000    -.0152683   -.0114096 
      ingr00 |  -.0285047   .0015145   -18.82   0.000     -.031473   -.0255364 
       _cons |   8.374729   1.540578     5.44   0.000     5.355223    11.39423  
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A.2 Outcome Variable= Failure Rate 
TREATMENT = T =School received PEC benefits in ALL 3 school years 
 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =  134448 
                                                       F( 61,134386) = 1033.25 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3388 
                                                       Root MSE      =  5.2287 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      F_rate |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           T |   .1980796   .0702383     2.82   0.005     .0604139    .3357453 
       Y2003 |  -1.047381   .0291767   -35.90   0.000    -1.104567   -.9901954 
         YxT |   .1800742   .0995932     1.81   0.071    -.0151266     .375275 
 stratio2000 |   .0300634   .0022801    13.19   0.000     .0255944    .0345323 
   rooms2000 |   .0219871   .0022339     9.84   0.000     .0176087    .0263655 
 classes2000 |  -.0339811   .0037257    -9.12   0.000    -.0412833   -.0266788 
      conafe |   .9355051   .0449416    20.82   0.000     .8474204     1.02359 
       oport |  -.7133806   .4309091    -1.66   0.098    -1.557955    .1311933 
     state_1 |   2.434663   .3688975     6.60   0.000     1.711631    3.157696 
     state_2 |   7.607568   .6118046    12.43   0.000     6.408442    8.806693 
     state_3 |   5.583815   .5282387    10.57   0.000     4.548476    6.619153 
     state_4 |   3.832959   .2628467    14.58   0.000     3.317784    4.348134 
     state_5 |   2.143668   .3519565     6.09   0.000      1.45384    2.833497 
     state_6 |   4.508043   .4376117    10.30   0.000     3.650332    5.365754 
     state_7 |   3.219163   .2630201    12.24   0.000     2.703649    3.734678 
     state_8 |   5.600857   .4290464    13.05   0.000     4.759934     6.44178 
     state_9 |   1.376221   .3238907     4.25   0.000     .7414009    2.011041 
    state_10 |   4.006962   .3962329    10.11   0.000     3.230352    4.783571 
    state_11 |   4.171262     .35058    11.90   0.000     3.484132    4.858393 
    state_12 |   5.464999   .3498957    15.62   0.000      4.77921    6.150788 
    state_13 |   2.060226   .3184391     6.47   0.000     1.436091    2.684361 
    state_14 |   3.138111   .3846064     8.16   0.000      2.38429    3.891933 
    state_15 |   1.530219   .3237406     4.73   0.000     .8956928    2.164744 
    state_16 |   4.041216   .3627164    11.14   0.000     3.330298    4.752133 
    state_17 |   1.117619   .3297379     3.39   0.001     .4713392      1.7639 
    state_18 |   2.544595   .4163586     6.11   0.000      1.72854     3.36065 
    state_19 |   2.330343   .3289732     7.08   0.000     1.685562    2.975125 
    state_20 |   5.045231   .3039462    16.60   0.000     4.449502     5.64096 
    state_21 |   2.114517   .3100254     6.82   0.000     1.506873    2.722162 
    state_22 |   2.923198   .3430289     8.52   0.000     2.250868    3.595528 
    state_23 |  (dropped) 
    state_24 |   2.854601   .3283376     8.69   0.000     2.211066    3.498137 
    state_25 |   5.089885   .4530035    11.24   0.000     4.202006    5.977763 
    state_26 |   5.161898   .4945844    10.44   0.000     4.192522    6.131274 
    state_27 |    2.59395   .2599482     9.98   0.000     2.084456    3.103443 
    state_28 |   1.887002   .3054839     6.18   0.000     1.288259    2.485745 
    state_29 |      .2334   .3175329     0.74   0.462    -.3889587    .8557587 
    state_30 |   4.780518   .2876575    16.62   0.000     4.216714    5.344321 
    state_31 |   3.133624   .2390557    13.11   0.000     2.665079    3.602168 
    state_32 |   2.085899   .3728122     5.60   0.000     1.355194    2.816604 
      tsch_1 |   .6495119   .0854651     7.60   0.000     .4820019     .817022 
      tsch_2 |  (dropped) 
      tloc_1 |     .00083   .0632119     0.01   0.990    -.1230642    .1247242 
      tloc_2 |  (dropped) 
      tloc_3 |   .2217426   .0532623     4.16   0.000     .1173495    .3261357 
         Dtr |   .5177304   .4673486     1.11   0.268    -.3982642    1.433725 
         Ftr |   22.82034   .9449181    24.15   0.000     20.96832    24.67236 
         Rtr |   1.747684   .8019574     2.18   0.029      .175862    3.319506 
     pobp500 |   7.53e-08   4.42e-08     1.71   0.088    -1.13e-08    1.62e-07 
    p5_hli00 |   .0147851   .0010577    13.98   0.000     .0127121    .0168581 
  dist_sal00 |  -.0000349   6.44e-06    -5.43   0.000    -.0000476   -.0000223 
  dist_sec00 |   .0000265   8.51e-06     3.11   0.002     9.82e-06    .0000432 
dist_medsu00 |   6.30e-06   2.57e-06     2.45   0.014     1.26e-06    .0000113 
  longitud00 |  -.0000202   2.06e-06    -9.79   0.000    -.0000243   -.0000162 
   latitud00 |  -5.29e-06   1.86e-06    -2.84   0.004    -8.94e-06   -1.64e-06 
   altitud00 |   .0004918   .0000303    16.22   0.000     .0004324    .0005512 
      ocup00 |   1.493048   .0913821    16.34   0.000     1.313941    1.672155 
      anal00 |   .0532805   .0034246    15.56   0.000     .0465683    .0599926 
      spri00 |   .0459383   .0024791    18.53   0.000     .0410794    .0507972 
      sani00 |   .0041255   .0009525     4.33   0.000     .0022586    .0059924 
      elec00 |   .0029936   .0010491     2.85   0.004     .0009374    .0050499 
      agua00 |  -.0002619   .0006224    -0.42   0.674    -.0014818     .000958 
      tier00 |   .0028444   .0012412     2.29   0.022     .0004116    .0052773 
      ingr00 |  -.0181014   .0015827   -11.44   0.000    -.0212035   -.0149993 




A.3 Outcome Variable= Repetition Rate 
TREATMENT = T =School received PEC benefits in ALL 3 school years 
 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =  134448 
                                                       F( 61,134386) =  858.74 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3035 
                                                       Root MSE      =  5.0748 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      R_rate |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           T |   .3250773   .0830695     3.91   0.000     .1622626     .487892 
       Y2003 |  -.9868672   .0282904   -34.88   0.000    -1.042316   -.9314186 
         YxT |  -.0765196   .1071412    -0.71   0.475    -.2865145    .1334752 
 stratio2000 |   .0223708   .0018976    11.79   0.000     .0186515    .0260902 
   rooms2000 |   .0045446   .0018212     2.50   0.013     .0009751    .0081141 
 classes2000 |  -.0311938   .0034994    -8.91   0.000    -.0380526    -.024335 
      conafe |    .905111   .0439567    20.59   0.000     .8189566    .9912653 
       oport |  -.9679208   .5725776    -1.69   0.091    -2.090162    .1543208 
     state_1 |   2.598785    .359162     7.24   0.000     1.894834    3.302736 
     state_2 |   6.284913   .5847793    10.75   0.000     5.138756    7.431069 
     state_3 |   5.126205   .5138663     9.98   0.000     4.119037    6.133374 
     state_4 |   3.564725   .2523081    14.13   0.000     3.070205    4.059244 
     state_5 |   2.051587   .3419499     6.00   0.000     1.381372    2.721803 
     state_6 |   3.846025   .4225236     9.10   0.000     3.017886    4.674163 
     state_7 |   2.882486   .2538156    11.36   0.000     2.385012     3.37996 
     state_8 |   4.560984   .4169957    10.94   0.000      3.74368    5.378288 
     state_9 |    1.63961   .3153827     5.20   0.000     1.021466    2.257755 
    state_10 |   3.734388   .3856632     9.68   0.000     2.978495    4.490281 
    state_11 |   3.138084   .3391734     9.25   0.000      2.47331    3.802857 
    state_12 |   5.019754   .3380086    14.85   0.000     4.357263    5.682245 
    state_13 |   2.360524   .3094984     7.63   0.000     1.753913    2.967135 
    state_14 |   3.114504   .3736951     8.33   0.000     2.382069     3.84694 
    state_15 |   1.705942   .3135351     5.44   0.000     1.091419    2.320465 
    state_16 |    4.26711   .3529367    12.09   0.000      3.57536    4.958859 
    state_17 |   1.244104   .3217968     3.87   0.000     .6133882     1.87482 
    state_18 |   2.565129   .4058663     6.32   0.000     1.769638    3.360619 
    state_19 |   2.184283   .3206714     6.81   0.000     1.555773    2.812793 
    state_20 |    4.85075   .2945003    16.47   0.000     4.273535    5.427965 
    state_21 |   2.407997   .3004433     8.01   0.000     1.819133     2.99686 
    state_22 |    3.15958   .3332661     9.48   0.000     2.506385    3.812775 
    state_23 |  (dropped) 
    state_24 |   2.622693   .3177826     8.25   0.000     1.999845    3.245541 
    state_25 |   4.539863    .443694    10.23   0.000     3.670231    5.409495 
    state_26 |   4.705247   .4816265     9.77   0.000     3.761268    5.649227 
    state_27 |   2.446463   .2508745     9.75   0.000     1.954754    2.938172 
    state_28 |    1.51782    .296573     5.12   0.000     .9365425    2.099098 
    state_29 |   .3449975     .30787     1.12   0.262     -.258422     .948417 
    state_30 |   4.398339   .2789019    15.77   0.000     3.851696    4.944982 
    state_31 |   2.808699   .2324116    12.09   0.000     2.353177    3.264222 
    state_32 |   1.987702   .3622708     5.49   0.000     1.277658    2.697746 
      tsch_1 |    .934537   .0799447    11.69   0.000     .7778469    1.091227 
      tsch_2 |  (dropped) 
      tloc_1 |  -.0288368   .0620912    -0.46   0.642    -.1505344    .0928608 
      tloc_2 |  (dropped) 
      tloc_3 |   .1514952   .0506319     2.99   0.003     .0522575    .2507329 
         Dtr |   .7288361   .3634651     2.01   0.045     .0164512    1.441221 
         Ftr |   .7958803   .8247056     0.97   0.335    -.8205276    2.412288 
         Rtr |   25.02785   1.026815    24.37   0.000     23.01531    27.04038 
     pobp500 |   4.97e-08   5.00e-08     0.99   0.320    -4.83e-08    1.48e-07 
    p5_hli00 |   .0124134   .0009856    12.59   0.000     .0104815    .0143452 
  dist_sal00 |  -.0000221   6.45e-06    -3.43   0.001    -.0000348   -9.50e-06 
  dist_sec00 |  -1.49e-06   8.21e-06    -0.18   0.856    -.0000176    .0000146 
dist_medsu00 |   4.93e-06   2.46e-06     2.01   0.045     1.13e-07    9.75e-06 
  longitud00 |   -.000018   2.01e-06    -8.97   0.000    -.0000219   -.0000141 
   latitud00 |  -1.79e-06   1.82e-06    -0.98   0.326    -5.36e-06    1.78e-06 
   altitud00 |   .0003839   .0000291    13.18   0.000     .0003268     .000441 
      ocup00 |    1.51866   .0860757    17.64   0.000     1.349954    1.687367 
      anal00 |    .034073   .0031774    10.72   0.000     .0278454    .0403006 
      spri00 |   .0446562     .00237    18.84   0.000      .040011    .0493015 
      sani00 |   .0030019   .0008963     3.35   0.001     .0012452    .0047586 
      elec00 |   .0007153    .000996     0.72   0.473    -.0012369    .0026675 
      agua00 |   .0009074   .0005892     1.54   0.124    -.0002474    .0020621 
      tier00 |   .0044936   .0011546     3.89   0.000     .0022306    .0067566 
      ingr00 |  -.0139739   .0015093    -9.26   0.000     -.016932   -.0110158 




APPENDIX B--Regression-based estimates of PEC’s Impact on Schools that received PEC benefits 
in ANY of the three school years 
B.1 Outcome Variable= Drop-out Rate 
TREATMENT = T2 =School received PEC benefits in ANY of the three school years 
 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =  149402 
                                                       F( 61,149340) =  373.64 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1848 
                                                       Root MSE      =  4.4845 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      D_rate |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          T2 |   .2082369   .0363471     5.73   0.000     .1369974    .2794764 
       Y2003 |  -.2127554   .0256851    -8.28   0.000    -.2630978   -.1624131 
        YxT2 |  -.0934741   .0523675    -1.78   0.074    -.1961134    .0091651 
 stratio2000 |   .0017969   .0016347     1.10   0.272    -.0014071     .005001 
   rooms2000 |  -.0430183   .0022696   -18.95   0.000    -.0474666   -.0385699 
 classes2000 |  -.1184863   .0041005   -28.90   0.000    -.1265232   -.1104494 
      conafe |   .1283671   .0373929     3.43   0.001     .0550777    .2016565 
       oport |   -.583416   .2835205    -2.06   0.040     -1.13911   -.0277215 
     state_1 |  -2.358204   .2977828    -7.92   0.000    -2.941853   -1.774556 
     state_2 |  (dropped) 
     state_3 |  -.4874376   .2825458    -1.73   0.085    -1.041222    .0663465 
     state_4 |  -2.071156   .4469586    -4.63   0.000    -2.947186   -1.195126 
     state_5 |  -3.668472   .2720171   -13.49   0.000     -4.20162   -3.135324 
     state_6 |   .6347598   .3581935     1.77   0.076    -.0672923    1.336812 
     state_7 |  -2.836014   .4185588    -6.78   0.000    -3.656381   -2.015648 
     state_8 |  -.6077827   .2293501    -2.65   0.008    -1.057304   -.1582612 
     state_9 |  -4.282441   .3350655   -12.78   0.000    -4.939163   -3.625719 
    state_10 |  -.3971536   .2690953    -1.48   0.140     -.924575    .1302678 
    state_11 |  -2.228414    .300873    -7.41   0.000    -2.818119   -1.638708 
    state_12 |  -2.777954   .3329133    -8.34   0.000    -3.430457   -2.125451 
    state_13 |  -3.579447   .3286339   -10.89   0.000    -4.223563   -2.935331 
    state_14 |    -2.1291   .2788881    -7.63   0.000    -2.675715   -1.582485 
    state_15 |   -2.66211   .3270895    -8.14   0.000    -3.303199   -2.021021 
    state_16 |  -3.115568   .3015414   -10.33   0.000    -3.706583   -2.524553 
    state_17 |  -2.188508   .3388092    -6.46   0.000    -2.852567   -1.524448 
    state_18 |  -1.282202    .273242    -4.69   0.000    -1.817751   -.7466529 
    state_19 |  -2.269428   .2971176    -7.64   0.000    -2.851773   -1.687084 
    state_20 |  -2.379242   .3673241    -6.48   0.000    -3.099189   -1.659294 
    state_21 |  -3.463213   .3436562   -10.08   0.000    -4.136772   -2.789654 
    state_22 |  -3.827323   .3153958   -12.13   0.000    -4.445493   -3.209154 
    state_23 |  -2.679444   .4786189    -5.60   0.000    -3.617528   -1.741361 
    state_24 |  -3.423418   .3097435   -11.05   0.000    -4.030509   -2.816327 
    state_25 |  -1.162334   .2185602    -5.32   0.000    -1.590707   -.7339603 
    state_26 |  -.5333663   .1919635    -2.78   0.005     -.909611   -.1571217 
    state_27 |  -3.708921   .4072272    -9.11   0.000    -4.507078   -2.910764 
    state_28 |  -1.473378   .3226443    -4.57   0.000    -2.105754   -.8410017 
    state_29 |  -3.761023   .3477958   -10.81   0.000    -4.442696    -3.07935 
    state_30 |  -2.951324   .3511878    -8.40   0.000    -3.639645   -2.263003 
    state_31 |   -3.32813   .4535183    -7.34   0.000    -4.217017   -2.439243 
    state_32 |  -2.061221   .2862081    -7.20   0.000    -2.622183   -1.500259 
      tsch_1 |  (dropped) 
      tsch_2 |  -.4285425   .0553188    -7.75   0.000    -.5369663   -.3201188 
      tloc_1 |  (dropped) 
      tloc_2 |    1.87685   .0559419    33.55   0.000     1.767205    1.986495 
      tloc_3 |   1.112605   .0445001    25.00   0.000     1.025386    1.199824 
         Dtr |     25.562   .6149444    41.57   0.000     24.35673    26.76728 
         Ftr |   -.127396     .62622    -0.20   0.839    -1.354775    1.099983 
         Rtr |  -.3366007   .5546237    -0.61   0.544    -1.423652    .7504506 
     pobp500 |   4.08e-07   5.42e-08     7.53   0.000     3.02e-07    5.15e-07 
    p5_hli00 |  -.0067307   .0006612   -10.18   0.000    -.0080267   -.0054347 
  dist_sal00 |   .0000178   6.10e-06     2.91   0.004     5.80e-06    .0000297 
  dist_sec00 |   .0000559   7.95e-06     7.03   0.000     .0000403    .0000715 
dist_medsu00 |   5.16e-06   2.32e-06     2.23   0.026     6.22e-07    9.71e-06 
  longitud00 |  -9.54e-07   1.70e-06    -0.56   0.575    -4.29e-06    2.38e-06 
   latitud00 |  -8.16e-07   1.60e-06    -0.51   0.611    -3.96e-06    2.32e-06 
   altitud00 |  -.0001653   .0000219    -7.56   0.000    -.0002082   -.0001224 
      ocup00 |   .4060714   .0737617     5.51   0.000     .2614999    .5506429 
      anal00 |   .0182625    .002544     7.18   0.000     .0132762    .0232487 
      spri00 |   .0149244    .002002     7.45   0.000     .0110006    .0188483 
      sani00 |   -.004266   .0007082    -6.02   0.000    -.0056541   -.0028779 
      elec00 |   .0062432   .0007805     8.00   0.000     .0047136    .0077729 
      agua00 |   -.001664   .0004701    -3.54   0.000    -.0025854   -.0007425 
      tier00 |  -.0133442    .000949   -14.06   0.000    -.0152042   -.0114841 
      ingr00 |  -.0288127   .0014314   -20.13   0.000    -.0316181   -.0260072 




B.2 Outcome Variable= Failure Rate 
TREATMENT = T2 =School received PEC benefits in ANY of the three school years 
 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =  149402 
                                                       F( 61,149340) = 1102.12 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3405 
                                                       Root MSE      =  5.0692 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      F_rate |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          T2 |   .1867685   .0377046     4.95   0.000     .1128683    .2606688 
       Y2003 |  -1.047381   .0291829   -35.89   0.000    -1.104579   -.9901832 
        YxT2 |   .0689302   .0554665     1.24   0.214    -.0397829    .1776434 
 stratio2000 |   .0267637    .002137    12.52   0.000     .0225752    .0309522 
   rooms2000 |   .0214107   .0020952    10.22   0.000     .0173041    .0255172 
 classes2000 |  -.0370496   .0033609   -11.02   0.000    -.0436368   -.0304623 
      conafe |   .8963522    .040652    22.05   0.000     .8166752    .9760292 
       oport |  -.6868781    .431498    -1.59   0.111    -1.532606    .1588493 
     state_1 |  -4.817781   .3118114   -15.45   0.000    -5.428925   -4.206637 
     state_2 |  (dropped) 
     state_3 |  -1.982284   .2302976    -8.61   0.000    -2.433662   -1.530905 
     state_4 |  -3.395664   .5025353    -6.76   0.000    -4.380623   -2.410705 
     state_5 |  -5.221135    .290319   -17.98   0.000    -5.790155   -4.652116 
     state_6 |   -2.91881   .3369311    -8.66   0.000    -3.579188   -2.258432 
     state_7 |  -4.013345   .4727011    -8.49   0.000     -4.93983   -3.086861 
     state_8 |  -1.912317   .2320782    -8.24   0.000    -2.367186   -1.457449 
     state_9 |  -5.910346   .3631048   -16.28   0.000    -6.622024   -5.198668 
    state_10 |  -3.436065   .2700527   -12.72   0.000    -3.965363   -2.906767 
    state_11 |   -3.13941   .3306096    -9.50   0.000    -3.787398   -2.491422 
    state_12 |  -1.876748   .3676942    -5.10   0.000    -2.597421   -1.156074 
    state_13 |  -5.218116   .3654435   -14.28   0.000    -5.934378   -4.501854 
    state_14 |  -4.171522   .2999604   -13.91   0.000    -4.759438   -3.583606 
    state_15 |  -5.786807   .3622514   -15.97   0.000    -6.496813   -5.076802 
    state_16 |  -3.323984   .3308045   -10.05   0.000    -3.972354   -2.675614 
    state_17 |  -6.142001   .3684857   -16.67   0.000    -6.864226   -5.419777 
    state_18 |  -4.843189   .2774396   -17.46   0.000    -5.386965   -4.299413 
    state_19 |  -4.966245   .3172727   -15.65   0.000    -5.588093   -4.344396 
    state_20 |  -2.195052   .4119086    -5.33   0.000    -3.002384   -1.387719 
    state_21 |   -5.24645   .3824166   -13.72   0.000    -5.995979   -4.496921 
    state_22 |  -4.432977    .353369   -12.54   0.000    -5.125573   -3.740381 
    state_23 |  -6.179936   .5467839   -11.30   0.000    -7.251621    -5.10825 
    state_24 |  -4.489297   .3392964   -13.23   0.000    -5.154312   -3.824283 
    state_25 |  -2.351619   .2199664   -10.69   0.000    -2.782749    -1.92049 
    state_26 |  -2.334322   .1646376   -14.18   0.000    -2.657008   -2.011635 
    state_27 |  -4.653195   .4600684   -10.11   0.000     -5.55492    -3.75147 
    state_28 |  -5.332366   .3481879   -15.31   0.000    -6.014808   -4.649925 
    state_29 |  -7.046405   .3846518   -18.32   0.000    -7.800314   -6.292495 
    state_30 |  -2.552215   .3940146    -6.48   0.000    -3.324476   -1.779955 
    state_31 |  -3.980312   .5131458    -7.76   0.000    -4.986067   -2.974556 
    state_32 |  -5.267735   .3044714   -17.30   0.000    -5.864493   -4.670977 
      tsch_1 |  (dropped) 
      tsch_2 |  -.6637177   .0812778    -8.17   0.000    -.8230205    -.504415 
      tloc_1 |  (dropped) 
      tloc_2 |   .0519444   .0573698     0.91   0.365    -.0604992     .164388 
      tloc_3 |   .1913727   .0498205     3.84   0.000     .0937255      .28902 
         Dtr |   .4695727   .4510378     1.04   0.298    -.4144522    1.353598 
         Ftr |   22.58659   .9195141    24.56   0.000     20.78437    24.38882 
         Rtr |   1.915658    .779027     2.46   0.014     .3887811    3.442536 
     pobp500 |   9.22e-08   3.98e-08     2.32   0.020     1.42e-08    1.70e-07 
    p5_hli00 |   .0137969   .0010068    13.70   0.000     .0118237    .0157702 
  dist_sal00 |  -.0000347   6.08e-06    -5.70   0.000    -.0000466   -.0000228 
  dist_sec00 |   .0000265   8.32e-06     3.18   0.001     .0000102    .0000428 
dist_medsu00 |   6.09e-06   2.42e-06     2.51   0.012     1.34e-06    .0000108 
  longitud00 |  -.0000191   1.91e-06   -10.02   0.000    -.0000228   -.0000154 
   latitud00 |  -4.83e-06   1.70e-06    -2.83   0.005    -8.17e-06   -1.49e-06 
   altitud00 |   .0004757   .0000288    16.51   0.000     .0004192    .0005321 
      ocup00 |   1.492329   .0870953    17.13   0.000     1.321624    1.663034 
      anal00 |   .0528759    .003338    15.84   0.000     .0463336    .0594183 
      spri00 |   .0463004   .0023952    19.33   0.000     .0416059    .0509949 
      sani00 |   .0034464   .0009134     3.77   0.000     .0016561    .0052366 
      elec00 |   .0030153   .0010297     2.93   0.003     .0009972    .0050335 
      agua00 |  -.0002796    .000601    -0.47   0.642    -.0014575    .0008982 
      tier00 |   .0038079   .0011989     3.18   0.001      .001458    .0061577 
      ingr00 |  -.0181083   .0014993   -12.08   0.000    -.0210468   -.0151697 




B.3 Outcome Variable= Repetition Rate 
TREATMENT = T2 =School received PEC benefits in ANY of the three school years 
 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =  149402 
                                                       F( 61,149340) =  931.20 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3068 
                                                       Root MSE      =  4.9128 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      R_rate |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          T2 |   .2543752   .0383051     6.64   0.000      .179298    .3294524 
       Y2003 |  -.9868672   .0282955   -34.88   0.000    -1.042326   -.9314086 
        YxT2 |  -.0337061   .0534199    -0.63   0.528     -.138408    .0709958 
 stratio2000 |   .0197009   .0017806    11.06   0.000      .016211    .0231909 
   rooms2000 |   .0030179   .0017193     1.76   0.079    -.0003518    .0063876 
 classes2000 |   -.035498   .0031405   -11.30   0.000    -.0416534   -.0293426 
      conafe |   .8556521   .0395523    21.63   0.000     .7781303    .9331738 
       oport |  -.9483788   .5729529    -1.66   0.098    -2.071355    .1745973 
     state_1 |  -3.459142   .2936526   -11.78   0.000    -4.034695   -2.883589 
     state_2 |  (dropped) 
     state_3 |  -1.223428   .2092898    -5.85   0.000    -1.633631    -.813224 
     state_4 |  -2.542274   .4796565    -5.30   0.000    -3.482391   -1.602157 
     state_5 |  -4.155354   .2705566   -15.36   0.000    -4.685639   -3.625068 
     state_6 |  -2.357445   .3139815    -7.51   0.000    -2.972843   -1.742048 
     state_7 |  -3.228698   .4500704    -7.17   0.000    -4.110827   -2.346569 
     state_8 |  -1.727158   .2146899    -8.04   0.000    -2.147946    -1.30637 
     state_9 |  -4.495874   .3460197   -12.99   0.000    -5.174065   -3.817682 
    state_10 |  -2.533411   .2503517   -10.12   0.000    -3.024096   -2.042727 
    state_11 |  -3.047449   .3074129    -9.91   0.000    -3.649972   -2.444926 
    state_12 |  -1.188856   .3473267    -3.42   0.001    -1.869609   -.5081026 
    state_13 |  -3.767491   .3447229   -10.93   0.000    -4.443141   -3.091841 
    state_14 |  -3.022784   .2790381   -10.83   0.000    -3.569693   -2.475874 
    state_15 |  -4.464439   .3425086   -13.03   0.000    -5.135749   -3.793129 
    state_16 |  -1.930963   .3101046    -6.23   0.000    -2.538762   -1.323164 
    state_17 |  -4.870536   .3493755   -13.94   0.000    -5.555305   -4.185767 
    state_18 |  -3.643838   .2588327   -14.08   0.000    -4.151145   -3.136531 
    state_19 |  -3.955171    .299595   -13.20   0.000    -4.542371   -3.367971 
    state_20 |  -1.259336   .3898891    -3.23   0.001     -2.02351   -.4951606 
    state_21 |   -3.81541   .3618242   -10.54   0.000    -4.524578   -3.106242 
    state_22 |  -3.053136   .3327504    -9.18   0.000     -3.70532   -2.400952 
    state_23 |  -5.296136   .5241017   -10.11   0.000    -6.323364   -4.268907 
    state_24 |  -3.572955   .3195236   -11.18   0.000    -4.199215   -2.946695 
    state_25 |  -1.716517   .2065041    -8.31   0.000    -2.121261   -1.311773 
    state_26 |  -1.571946   .1422466   -11.05   0.000    -1.850746   -1.293145 
    state_27 |  -3.666366   .4376811    -8.38   0.000    -4.524212    -2.80852 
    state_28 |  -4.552629   .3291755   -13.83   0.000    -5.197807   -3.907452 
    state_29 |  -5.790316    .363419   -15.93   0.000     -6.50261   -5.078022 
    state_30 |  -1.793995   .3734377    -4.80   0.000    -2.525925   -1.062065 
    state_31 |  -3.211448   .4908267    -6.54   0.000    -4.173459   -2.249438 
    state_32 |  -4.200122   .2848126   -14.75   0.000    -4.758349   -3.641895 
      tsch_1 |  (dropped) 
      tsch_2 |  -.9482549   .0759569   -12.48   0.000    -1.097129   -.7993808 
      tloc_1 |  (dropped) 
      tloc_2 |   .0639927   .0561466     1.14   0.254    -.0460536     .174039 
      tloc_3 |   .1566742   .0469285     3.34   0.001     .0646953    .2486531 
         Dtr |    .682093   .3515106     1.94   0.052    -.0068606    1.371047 
         Ftr |   .6573698   .8103173     0.81   0.417    -.9308357    2.245575 
         Rtr |    25.1554    1.01452    24.80   0.000     23.16696    27.14384 
     pobp500 |   7.79e-08   4.51e-08     1.73   0.084    -1.04e-08    1.66e-07 
    p5_hli00 |   .0116296   .0009386    12.39   0.000     .0097898    .0134693 
  dist_sal00 |  -.0000229   6.09e-06    -3.76   0.000    -.0000348    -.000011 
  dist_sec00 |  -1.89e-06   8.02e-06    -0.24   0.814    -.0000176    .0000138 
dist_medsu00 |   5.11e-06   2.32e-06     2.21   0.027     5.74e-07    9.65e-06 
  longitud00 |  -.0000174   1.85e-06    -9.40   0.000     -.000021   -.0000138 
   latitud00 |  -1.33e-06   1.66e-06    -0.80   0.423    -4.59e-06    1.93e-06 
   altitud00 |   .0003717   .0000276    13.45   0.000     .0003176    .0004259 
      ocup00 |   1.531761   .0820573    18.67   0.000      1.37093    1.692591 
      anal00 |   .0339757    .003088    11.00   0.000     .0279233    .0400281 
      spri00 |   .0448098   .0022719    19.72   0.000     .0403569    .0492627 
      sani00 |   .0024334   .0008598     2.83   0.005     .0007483    .0041186 
      elec00 |   .0006683   .0009771     0.68   0.494    -.0012468    .0025835 
      agua00 |   .0009022   .0005689     1.59   0.113    -.0002128    .0020172 
      tier00 |   .0054192   .0011158     4.86   0.000     .0032323    .0076061 
      ingr00 |  -.0141449   .0014293    -9.90   0.000    -.0169462   -.0113435 







C.1 Determinants of Participation in PEC 
TREATMENT = T =School received PEC benefits in ALL three school years 
 
Probit estimates                                  Number of obs   =      67160 
                                                  LR chi2(57)     =    2468.94 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -6937.0591                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1511 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           T |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 stratio2000 |  -.0008036   .0017121    -0.47   0.639    -.0041593    .0025521 
   rooms2000 |   .0064416   .0012339     5.22   0.000     .0040231    .0088601 
 classes2000 |   .0301939   .0028276    10.68   0.000     .0246518    .0357359 
      conafe |  -.4195996    .037626   -11.15   0.000    -.4933452   -.3458541 
     state_1 |   -.551373   .3170309    -1.74   0.082    -1.172742    .0699961 
     state_2 |  -1.172184   .5214263    -2.25   0.025    -2.194161   -.1502076 
     state_3 |  -1.140646   .4656272    -2.45   0.014    -2.053258    -.228033 
     state_4 |  -.5081744   .2048262    -2.48   0.013    -.9096263   -.1067224 
     state_5 |  -.7462749   .2944661    -2.53   0.011    -1.323418    -.169132 
     state_6 |  -.8363639   .3547388    -2.36   0.018    -1.531639   -.1410886 
     state_7 |  -.5013243   .2043918    -2.45   0.014    -.9019249   -.1007237 
     state_8 |  -.5554846   .3587164    -1.55   0.121    -1.258556    .1475866 
     state_9 |  -.7386082   .2643976    -2.79   0.005    -1.256818   -.2203984 
    state_10 |  -.5187586   .3269634    -1.59   0.113    -1.159595    .1220779 
    state_11 |  -.7361206   .2865088    -2.57   0.010    -1.297667   -.1745737 
    state_12 |   -.982988   .2865345    -3.43   0.001    -1.544585   -.4213907 
    state_13 |  -.8339046   .2638017    -3.16   0.002    -1.350946   -.3168627 
    state_14 |  -.9369757   .3220142    -2.91   0.004    -1.568112   -.3058395 
    state_15 |  -.6858239   .2621866    -2.62   0.009      -1.1997   -.1719476 
    state_16 |  -.7697112     .30009    -2.56   0.010    -1.357877   -.1815457 
    state_17 |  -.7586732    .275424    -2.75   0.006    -1.298494   -.2188521 
    state_18 |   -1.05531    .358791    -2.94   0.003    -1.758527    -.352092 
    state_19 |  -.3267466   .2677351    -1.22   0.222    -.8514978    .1980046 
    state_20 |  -.5115887   .2403526    -2.13   0.033    -.9826711   -.0405063 
    state_21 |  -.3931119   .2485921    -1.58   0.114    -.8803434    .0941196 
    state_22 |  -.5979792   .2802927    -2.13   0.033    -1.147343   -.0486156 
    state_24 |  -.5942388   .2704591    -2.20   0.028    -1.124329   -.0641487 
    state_25 |  -.8470996   .3804186    -2.23   0.026    -1.592706   -.1014929 
    state_26 |  -.8201415   .4252993    -1.93   0.054    -1.653713    .0134299 
    state_27 |  -.5272191   .2029133    -2.60   0.009    -.9249218   -.1295163 
    state_28 |  -.6577347   .2483982    -2.65   0.008    -1.144586   -.1708832 
    state_29 |    -.91045   .2731235    -3.33   0.001    -1.445762   -.3751376 
    state_30 |  -.7769429   .2282211    -3.40   0.001    -1.224248   -.3296378 
    state_31 |  -.3350828   .1757511    -1.91   0.057    -.6795486    .0093829 
    state_32 |  -.6138452   .3110742    -1.97   0.048    -1.223539    -.004151 
      tsch_2 |  -.3851966   .0944998    -4.08   0.000    -.5704129   -.1999804 
      tloc_2 |  -.0200521   .0534783    -0.37   0.708    -.1248676    .0847635 
      tloc_3 |   .0795105   .0464987     1.71   0.087    -.0116253    .1706463 
         Dtr |  -.2164427   .2793388    -0.77   0.438    -.7639368    .3310514 
         Ftr |  -.9417658   .3588904    -2.62   0.009    -1.645178   -.2383535 
         Rtr |   .3754472   .3410207     1.10   0.271     -.292941    1.043835 
     pobp500 |  -2.81e-07   4.29e-08    -6.55   0.000    -3.65e-07   -1.97e-07 
    p5_hli00 |   .0037251   .0009258     4.02   0.000     .0019105    .0055398 
  dist_sal00 |  -.0000137   6.66e-06    -2.05   0.040    -.0000267   -6.18e-07 
  dist_sec00 |   -.000139   .0000162    -8.59   0.000    -.0001707   -.0001073 
dist_medsu00 |  -7.11e-06   2.92e-06    -2.43   0.015    -.0000128   -1.38e-06 
  longitud00 |   3.48e-06   1.80e-06     1.94   0.053    -4.24e-08    7.00e-06 
   latitud00 |  -2.28e-06   1.52e-06    -1.50   0.134    -5.26e-06    7.04e-07 
   altitud00 |  -.0000384   .0000258    -1.49   0.136    -.0000889    .0000121 
      ocup00 |   .2702026   .0820544     3.29   0.001     .1093789    .4310263 
      anal00 |  -.0031729   .0036882    -0.86   0.390    -.0104017    .0040559 
      spri00 |  -.0079047      .0025    -3.16   0.002    -.0128047   -.0030047 
      sani00 |  -.0033674   .0010408    -3.24   0.001    -.0054073   -.0013274 
      elec00 |   -.002206   .0015504    -1.42   0.155    -.0052448    .0008329 
      agua00 |  -.0027679   .0006742    -4.11   0.000    -.0040894   -.0014465 
      tier00 |  -.0018328   .0012294    -1.49   0.136    -.0042424    .0005768 
      ingr00 |   .0034354    .001465     2.34   0.019      .000564    .0063067 
       _cons |  -4.177962   1.524816    -2.74   0.006    -7.166547   -1.189377 
note: oport != 0 predicts failure perfectly 




C.2 Determinants of Participation in PEC  
TREATMENT = T2 =School received PEC benefits in ANY of the 3 school years 
 
Probit estimates                                  Number of obs   =      74637 
                                                  LR chi2(57)     =    9257.44 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -23325.208                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1656 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          T2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 stratio2000 |   .0020239    .000696     2.91   0.004     .0006598    .0033879 
   rooms2000 |   .0080213   .0007831    10.24   0.000     .0064865    .0095561 
 classes2000 |    .036371   .0018271    19.91   0.000       .03279     .039952 
      conafe |  -.2122981   .0204984   -10.36   0.000    -.2524742   -.1721221 
     state_1 |   .1719259   .1644613     1.05   0.296    -.1504123    .4942641 
     state_3 |  -.3791683    .133294    -2.84   0.004    -.6404198   -.1179169 
     state_4 |   .3078638   .2574815     1.20   0.232    -.1967906    .8125183 
     state_5 |    .147951   .1483698     1.00   0.319    -.1428484    .4387504 
     state_6 |  -.2131388    .167507    -1.27   0.203    -.5414464    .1151689 
     state_7 |   .0075361    .240177     0.03   0.975    -.4632022    .4782745 
     state_8 |   .4233576   .1108825     3.82   0.000     .2060318    .6406833 
     state_9 |  -.0414446   .1851515    -0.22   0.823    -.4043348    .3214457 
    state_10 |   .1428007   .1347355     1.06   0.289    -.1212761    .4068775 
    state_11 |  -.1248347   .1652277    -0.76   0.450     -.448675    .1990056 
    state_12 |  -.3018109   .1864608    -1.62   0.106    -.6672673    .0636455 
    state_13 |   .0569361    .184527     0.31   0.758    -.3047301    .4186024 
    state_14 |  -.1019314   .1498711    -0.68   0.496    -.3956734    .1918106 
    state_15 |   .2105106   .1830845     1.15   0.250    -.1483285    .5693497 
    state_16 |  -.1016231   .1653347    -0.61   0.539    -.4256731    .2224269 
    state_17 |  -.1809963   .1917434    -0.94   0.345    -.5568064    .1948138 
    state_18 |  -.3782579   .1438102    -2.63   0.009    -.6601207    -.096395 
    state_19 |   .6704383   .1610887     4.16   0.000     .3547102    .9861664 
    state_20 |  -.3220059   .2091649    -1.54   0.124    -.7319616    .0879498 
    state_21 |   .2452444   .1935436     1.27   0.205     -.134094    .6245828 
    state_22 |   .0182479   .1785126     0.10   0.919    -.3316305    .3681262 
    state_23 |   1.905368   .2773183     6.87   0.000     1.361834    2.448901 
    state_24 |   -.086837   .1718583    -0.51   0.613     -.423673    .2499991 
    state_25 |   -.182932   .1078462    -1.70   0.090    -.3943066    .0284426 
    state_26 |  -.4219763   .0849932    -4.96   0.000    -.5885598   -.2553928 
    state_27 |     .10438   .2355861     0.44   0.658    -.3573603    .5661204 
    state_28 |   .5756104   .1767454     3.26   0.001     .2291958     .922025 
    state_29 |  -.4177839     .20528    -2.04   0.042    -.8201252   -.0154425 
    state_30 |  -.0558236    .200906    -0.28   0.781    -.4495921    .3379449 
    state_31 |   .4745062   .2617409     1.81   0.070    -.0384965    .9875089 
    state_32 |  -.2965056   .1561115    -1.90   0.058    -.6024785    .0094672 
      tsch_1 |  -.1910342   .0374281    -5.10   0.000    -.2643919   -.1176765 
      tloc_1 |   .0894127   .0303018     2.95   0.003     .0300223     .148803 
      tloc_3 |   .2482308   .0247591    10.03   0.000     .1997039    .2967576 
         Dtr |  -.2148762   .1552095    -1.38   0.166    -.5190812    .0893287 
         Ftr |  -.3353692   .2074653    -1.62   0.106    -.7419937    .0712554 
         Rtr |   .1958769   .2031029     0.96   0.335    -.2021974    .5939512 
     pobp500 |  -3.80e-07   2.65e-08   -14.36   0.000    -4.32e-07   -3.28e-07 
    p5_hli00 |   .0038892   .0004747     8.19   0.000     .0029588    .0048195 
  dist_sal00 |   -.000036   3.54e-06   -10.19   0.000     -.000043   -.0000291 
  dist_sec00 |  -.0001403   6.47e-06   -21.69   0.000     -.000153   -.0001276 
dist_medsu00 |  -3.88e-06   1.29e-06    -3.01   0.003    -6.41e-06   -1.35e-06 
  longitud00 |   5.19e-06   9.66e-07     5.37   0.000     3.29e-06    7.08e-06 
   latitud00 |  -4.47e-06   8.44e-07    -5.30   0.000    -6.13e-06   -2.82e-06 
   altitud00 |  -.0000467    .000014    -3.34   0.001     -.000074   -.0000193 
      ocup00 |   .0388624   .0422946     0.92   0.358    -.0440335    .1217584 
      anal00 |   -.000799   .0016754    -0.48   0.633    -.0040828    .0024848 
      spri00 |  -.0053736   .0012208    -4.40   0.000    -.0077663   -.0029808 
      sani00 |  -.0009409   .0004664    -2.02   0.044     -.001855   -.0000269 
      elec00 |  -.0009151   .0005939    -1.54   0.123    -.0020792     .000249 
      agua00 |  -.0012308   .0003195    -3.85   0.000    -.0018569   -.0006047 
      tier00 |   -.006213   .0006108   -10.17   0.000    -.0074103   -.0050158 
      ingr00 |    .002623   .0007322     3.58   0.000     .0011879     .004058 
       _cons |   -5.35894   1.087819    -4.93   0.000    -7.491027   -3.226853 
 
 
 
 